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UNCLE SAM DOESN'T WANT YOU:
ENTERING THE FEDERAL STRONGHOLD
OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST HANDICAPPED INDIVIDUALS
Brian J. Linn*
Handicapped individuals have traditionally experienced great
difficulty in gaining employment. In this Article, Mr. Linn, of the
National Center For Law and The Handicapped, examines the con-
gressional intent behind Title V of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act. The
author postulates that it was the Congress' intent to set up the
federal government as a model employer of the handicapped and
concludes that it is the responsibility of the judiciary to insure that
this purpose is fidfilled.
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government of-
ficials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are
commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the
government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupu-
lously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.
For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.'
Title V2 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 has been lauded as a civil
rights act for the handicapped. With an expressed goal of promoting
and expanding employment opportunities for handicapped individu-
als, 3 Title V includes four statutes which are designed to accomplish
this impressive goal.
Section 5014 requires Executive Departments and Agencies to file
affirmative action program plans with the United States Civil Service
Commission and the Interagency Committee on Employment of the
Handicapped. Section 502 5 creates the Architectural and Transporta-
tion Barriers Compliance Board, whose mission it is, in part, to en-
sure that access to certain employment sites exists for handicapped
* B.A., University of Washington: J.D., Conzaga University, former staff attorney at The
National Center for Law and the Handicapped; Mr. Linn is presently engaged in private prac-
tice in Seattle, Washington.
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
2. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 790-794 (Supp. V 1975) [hereinafter cited as Title V].
3. 29 U.S.C. § 701(8) (Supp. V 1975).
4. See 29 U.S.C. § 791 (Supp. V 1975) [hereinafter cited as Section 501].
5. See 29 U.S.C. § 792 (Supp. V 1975) [hereinafter cited as Section 502].
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employees and applicants. 6  Section 5037 mandates affirmative action
by federal contractors and subcontractors. Section 5048 prohibits dis-
crimination against otherwise qualified handicapped individuals in
programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance.
Although Title V appears to offer handicapped individuals a com-
prehensive system for combatting employment discrimination in the
public and private sectors, 9 careful analysis of the legislative scheme
suggests that its weakest link is found in Section 501.
This Article explores problem areas in federal employment policies
and analyzes the potential effectiveness of various causes of action
designed to rectify discriminatory employment practices. Emphasiz-
ing the important focal point of Section 501, this Article also explores
other statutory and regulatory provisions with the hope of furthering
the effectiveness of remedies for individuals who experience employ-
ment discrimination in federal agencies by reason of their handi-
capping conditions.
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT As A MODEL EMPLOYER
OF HANDICAPPED INDIVIDUALS
While the number of handicapped individuals in the United States
is not adequately documented, there is no question that such indi-
6. The Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board has, as a primary func-
tion, the obligation to insure compliance with federal statutes prohibiting architectural barriers
in federally occupied and funded buildings and facilities. The Board enforces the Architectural
Barriers Act of 1968, §§ 1-6, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-56, (1970). The Board has promulgated regula-
tions outlining practice and procedures for compliance hearings. 36 C.F.R. § 1150 (1977).
The importance of the Board's mandate in the context of employment discrimination cannot
be underestimated. Congress recognized that the existence of public transportation systems and
employment sites which are accessible to and usable by handicapped individuals is a prerequis-
ite to the full implementation of its goal of expanding and promoting employment opportunities.
S. REP. No. 1139, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1974); S. REP. No. 319, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8
(1973). Effective implementation of federal law prohibiting barriers is inextricably intertwined
with the Congessional goals of Section 501. Although the Board does not have the authority to
review complaints of discrimination in employment under Section 501, complaints alleging vio-
lations of the Architectural Barriers Act can be filed with the Board at the following address:
Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board
Washington, D.C. 20201.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (Supp. V 1975) [hereinafter cited as Section 503].
8. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975) [hereinafter cited as Section 504].
9. The restricted ambit of the coverage of Title V is justifiable reason for continuing to
advocate the need to amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
e-15 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (Supp. V 1975), to include handicapped
individuals. See, e.g., Comment, Potluck Protections For Handicapped Discriminatees: The
Need to Amend Title VII to Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis of Disability, 8 Loy. CHI. L.J.
814 (1977).
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viduals are severely under-represented in federal employment. 10 The
Civil Service Commission's most recent Annual Report to the Con-
gress 1 documents the failure of the federal government to provide
equal employment opportunities for disabled individuals. As of De-
cember 21, 1976, the Commission estimates that only 2.8 percent of
all employees in the federal government are handicapped. 12
This statistical disparity is an indication of the problems which lie
below the surface of the federal organizational structure. Although
good intentions and favorable nondiscrimination policy statements
abound, the federal bureaucracy has failed to implement effective
nondiscriminatory employment practices. A dichotomy exists as a re-
sult. On the one hand, federal agencies have set high standards for
conduct for federal contractors and federally assisted programs. On
the other hand, the federal government has continued to blatantly
discriminate against disabled individuals seeking employment.
For example, the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the
United States Department of Justice recently circulated a sheet enti-
tled "Information About the Requirements for the Position of General
Attorney (Nationality)." 13 The circular set out "physical require-
ments" for attorney applicants which would clearly be illegal under
10. In a survey based upon the 1970 United States Census, the President's Committee on
Employment of the Handicapped reports that 9.3 percent of the work force is handicapped.
PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED, ONE IN ELEVEN: HAND-
ICAPPED ADULTS IN AMERICA 2 (1975). The work force ages reported are those between 16 and
64 years. Id.
Although the utilization of statistics to prove employment discrimination in cases involving
handicapped plaintiffs may pose more complex problems than similar statistical proof in Title
VII cases, the federal government employment statistics document the overall failure of the
government to adequately integrate its work force. See generally Gitler, Fair Employment And
The Handicapped: A Legal Perspective, 27 DEPAUL L. REV. 953 (1978).
11. UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, EMPLOYMENT OF HANDICAPPED INDI-
VIDUALS INCLUDING DISABLED VETERANS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (Sept. 30, 1977)
[hereinafter referred to as 1977 CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION REPORT]. This report was filed
pursuant to the mandate of Section 501 that the Civil Service Commission make a complete
report, at the end of each fiscal year, with respect to the "practices of and achievements in
hiring, placements, and advancement of handicapped individuals by each department, agency,
and instrumentality and the effectiveness of the affirmative action programs required by [Section
501]." 29 U.S.C. § 791(d) (Snpp. V 1975).
12. 1977 CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION REPORT at 11, vi. This figure indicates a negligible
increase of .08 percent during 1976 in the percentage of handicapped employees in the federal
work force. UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, EMPLOYMENT OF HANDICAPPED IN-
DIVIDUALS INCLUDING DISABLED VETERANS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 17 (June 30, 1976)
[hereinafter cited as 1976 CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION REPORT].
13. Form CO-163 (Rev. 11-5-76).
1049
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:1047
Sections 50314 and 504.15 Applicants were required to meet certain
criteria with respect to vision, hearing, speech, and ambulatory abil-
ity.1 6 In one broad sweep this federal agency has disqualified attor-
ney applicants with wide and varied disabilities. This odious result
reflects decades of paternalistic "selective placement" 17 employment
policies which have perpetuated broad presumptions concerning an
individual's ability to perform the essential functions of a job, pre-
sumptions based exclusively upon the employer's narrow perception
of the abilities of handicapped people.
This notion has combined with the inherent bureaucratic need to
compile, classify and categorize and has resulted in Civil Service
Commission Handbooks X-118 and X-118C. The pounds of paperwork
contained therein form the basis for the multitude of exclusionary job
descriptions which emanate from the various federal agencies. Ounce
for ounce, the Handbooks justify more discriminatory employment
14. Under Section 503, job qualification requirements which tend to screen out qualified
handicapped individuals are proscribed unless the employer can meet the burden of demon-
strating business necessity or safe performance of the job. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741.6(c)(2)-60.-
2 50.6(c)(2) (1977). The same requirement is imposed upon federal contractors and ssbcontractors
under the Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, 38 U.S.C. § 2012 (Supp.
V 1975).
15. Under the regulations implementing Section 504 which govern programs and activities
receiving federal financial assistance from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, a
recipient may not utilize selection criterion which screens out or tends to screen out handi-
capped persons unless job-related and alternative job-related tests which are not discriminatory
do not exist. 45 C.F.R. § 8 4.13(a) (1977). In fact, a recipient is not even permitted to make
pre-employment inquiries of an applicant concerning whether the applicant is a handicapped
individual. Id. at § 84.14(a). Similarly, in the regulations implementing Executive Order 11941,
which set forth guidelines to be followed by other federal agencies and instrumentalities in the
implementation of Section 504, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare defines dis-
criminatory practices to include the use of employment criteria which discriminate against hand-
icapped individuals. Id. at § 85.54. Again, recipients may not conduct pre-employment in-
quiries concerning the handicapping disabilities of applicants for employment. Id. at § 85.55.
16. The circular provides:
Applicants must be physically able to perform efficiently the duties of the posi-
tion. Good distance vision and ability to read without strain printed material the
size of typewritten characters, are required. Ability to hear the conversational voice
is required. Since the duties of the position are responsible and require extensive
oral communication with the public, applicants must possess emotional and mental
stability and unimpaired speech. Since some positions require considerable travel,
applicants must be able to drive an automobile and to carry the necessary files,
forms, and instruction manuals. Any physical condition which would cause the
applicant to be a hazard to himself or to others is disqualifying.
Form CO-163 (Rev. 11-5-76).
17. "Selective placement" is defined as "[t]he careful matching of the abilities of handi-
capped persons with the duties of particular positions." 306 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL 1,
1-1 (1969). The preoccupation with insuring that the handicapped worker is properly placed
began in 1942 as a result of the impact of World War II upon the availability of workers.
UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, JOB ANALYSES FOB PHYSICAL FITNESS RE-
QUtREMENTS, Handbook M-605 at 1 (1956). See also note 20 infra.
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practices than any other government employment policies.' 8
Further, the Federal Personnel Manual is a labyrinth which may
stymie any attempt to fairly treat a handicapped applicant or
employee. 19 Its damage does not stop with mere meandering confu-
sion; this paper tower actually serves to disguise the discrimination
which takes place under the guise of "selective placement." 20
18. The job description of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, supra note 16 and
accompanying text, is derived from the Handbooks. While in some cases each particular job
category has a specific, uniquely designed set of "physical requirements," in other cases a
number of "standard paragraphs" are provided, one of which is then selected for each particular
job description. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION HANDBOOK X-118 at 17-18. In this respect, the
Handbooks are not dissimilar to potluck dinners in which participants choose one dish from
each category (appetizers, entrees, desserts).
Thus, the Handbooks dictate that individuals with limbs amputated cannot be Quarantine
Inspectors (GS-1864), and that individuals with large internal hemorrhoids (or any hemorrhoids
accompanied by bleeding) cannot be employed in any of the Police Series positions available
with the Federal Aviation Agency (CS-083, at 13).
19. For example, if a particular federal agency desired to modify the requirements of a
particular job because the agency deemed the requirements to be unduly restrictive, it could
waive the physical standards on a case by case basis. 271 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL 11
(1976). However, such an action would be of little consolation to those handicapped individuals
who failed to apply because the job description appeared to unilaterally disqualify them from
consideration.
If the federal agency desired to invite all qualified applicants to apply by removing an un-
necessary disqualification based upon a particular handicapping condition, contradictory provi-
sions of the Federal Personnel Manual would prevent an agency from comprehending its power
to make such modifications. Chapter 271 indicates that "agencies must submit for prior Com-
mission Approval proposals to modify existing physical standards or to establish new standards."
Id. at 271-11. Elsewhere, the Federal Personnel Manual provides that the agency may disre-
gard a physical requirement established for a particular position to ensure that "only the
minimum physical abilities necessary" are required, without prior submission to the Civil Ser-
vice Commission. FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL SUPP. 339-31, at 1 (1975). The confusion gen-
erated concerning the agency's ability to independently lower qualification standards can only
help to ensure that those archaic standards will remain.
20. The results of "selective placement" policies can tend to cloak the discriminatory prac-
tices of an agency. The United States Postal Service is a prime example. The Postal Service has
been lauded for having hired 842 severely physically handicapped employees tinder a special
appointing authority. UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, A CHAIN OF COOPERATION:
SEVERELY PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED EMPLOYEES IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE 3 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as A CHAIN OF COOPERATION]. The Postal Service's record under this particular
appointing authority nearly doubles the amount of placements made by the next closest federal
agency. The perceived success of the Postal Service in this program is consistent with former
Postmaster General Benjamin Bailar's recent statement: "For many years, the Postal Service has
pursued an aggressive program designed to assure handicapped persons the opportunity for
employment commensurate with their abilities." 1 DISABLED USA 1 (1978). However, further
examination of the Postal Service's record discloses that their hiring practices tinder this par-
ticular program were indeed "selective." Of the 842 individuals hired, 739 were deaf or hearing
impaired. A CHAIN OF COOPERATION at 6. Of these individuals with auditory impairments, 91
percent were hired as Distribution Clerks. Id. at 3. The rationale behind these hirings is that
"because of constantly high noise level sound in this type of job, the deaf are ideally suited for
it." Id.
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Under such a scheme, the federal government becomes the subject
of ridicule and distain rather than a model of fair employment prac-
tices. In examining the importance of the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Act of 1972,21 the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia eloquently stated the social importance of fair and effective equal
employment practices by the federal government. The court inti-
mated that Congress was concerned with equality when it passed the
1972 Act and that the federal government must take the role of a
leader in insuring equal employment opportunity. 22
While not rising to the level of a legitimate defense for Section 503
and 504 employers, federal employment practices stand to thwart the
Although the individuals hired as Distribution Clerks cannot be faulted for seeking employ-
ment in a job where their particular disability was viewed as an asset, the Postal Service can
hardly be viewed as a model employer on the basis of these placements. Clearly, the individuals
were indeed qualified to perform the particular job, and their hiring does not reflect upon the
overall performance of the Postal Service in fairly treating handicapped individuals. In fact, the
statistics provided as of December 31, 1976, indicate that the aggregate percentage of handi-
capped employees in the Postal Service is merely 1.42 percent. 1977 CIVIL SERVICE COMMIS-
SION REPORT at vi. Indeed, the Postal Service has been required to defend substantially more
litigation alleging discrimination on the basis of disability than any other federal agency. See,
e.g., Martel v. Brassard, No. C78-30 (D.N.H. filed January 26, 1978); Nocho v. United States
Postal Service, Civ. No. 78-291 PHX/WPC (D. Ariz. filed, April 10, 1978); Gibson v. United
States Postal Service, Civil Action No. 77-2453 (W.D. Tenn. Consent Order April 27, 178);
Roberts v. United States Postal Service, 78 Civ. 1214 (CLG) (S.D.N.Y. filed March 17, 1978);
Henry v. United States Postal Service, Civil Action No. 77-1490 (D.D.C. filed August 31,
1977); Counts v United States Postal Service, No. 77-0028 (N.D. Fla. filed June 21, 1977);
Atkinson v. United States Postal Service, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5208 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Smith v.
United States Postal Service, Civil Action No. 76-2452-S (D. Mass. August 10, 1977); Snow v.
Lawrence, No. C-75-1173 SW (SJ) (N.D. Cal. filed Nov. 15, 1977).
The Civil Service Commission vociferously asserts that "selective placement" programs are
designed to assist qualified handicapped individuals, arguing that: "emphasis is on ability rather
than disability." FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL, Chapter 306 at 3, subchapter 1, 1-2 (1969).
However, "selective placement" results in limiting the range of job opportunities which are
available to any given individual. Over time, the prodigious emphasis placed upon the need for
accurate matching of handicapped individuals with job requirments also perpetuates existing
stereotypes. In describing the appropriate placement of individuals who are mentally retarded,
the Civil Service Commission's inbred conceptions of mentally retarded individuals have led to
the following conclusion: "The secret of employing the retarded successfilly lies in the identifi-
cation of jobs that can be matched to the skill or talent that a particular individual has de-
veloped. It is not necessary, nor even wise, to use a bulldozer where a shovel would do the job
nicely." UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HANDBOOK OF SELECTIVE PLACEMENT
IN FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYMENT 31 (1975).
Whether the Civil Service Commission intended a "humorous" metaphor or whether the
decreased use of mechanization was actually contemplated is uncertain. What is certain is that
concepts of "selective placement" have sometimes grown to be detrimentally paternalistic and
segregationist.
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Snpp. V 1975) (amending Title VII to prohibit employment
discrimination in the Federal government).
22. Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The court noted specifically:
Equality is the touchstone of a democratic government, and Congress in 1972 finally
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beneficient purposes of the Rehabilitation Act. 23 The continuing fail-
ire of the federal government to provide equal employment oppor-
tunities for disabled individuals indicates that the legal system must
begin to support individuals adversely affected by employment dis-
crimination in federal agencies.
CAUSES OF ACTION UNDER FEDERAL STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
While generally considered newcomers to the status of a "protected
class," handicapped individuals theoretically have been afforded statu-
tory protection from employment discrimination in the federal gov-
ernment since 1948.24 Thus the protections afforded in Section 501,
unlike the rights granted under Sections 503 and 504, are neither the
first nor the exclusive federal statutory protection for disabled
employees. The express public policy of prohibiting employment dis-
crimination against handicapped individuals in the federal govern-
ment precedes, by nearly two decades, the equal employment oppor-
tunity procedures which were established for the protection of
individuals from discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
perceived the injustice and hypocrisy of a system that demanded more from private
employers than it was willing to give itself, that sought to establish a regime of
equality for the private sector of the economy while leaving its own house in disar-
ray, rife with discrimination.
Nor Was the actuality of equal employment opportunity alone sufficient. The fed-
eral government plays a vital role in all aspects of our society, it is a model for all
and exercises a significant educative force by its example. As a Senate Report
opined, because the "policies, actions, and programs [of the federal government]
strongly influenced the activities of all other enterprises, organizations and groups,
in no area is government action more important than in the area of civil rights.
Id. at 136.
23. In several cases brought by the United States against private employers under Title VII,
defendants have unsuccessfully contended that such suits may not be maintained against them
when the United States permits employment discrimination in its own practices. These cases
illustrate that the defense of "unclean hands" in an action in equity will not be permitted to
frustrate the purpose of protective legislation.
Even if the instances suggested by the Company of Employment Discrimination by
departments of the United States are possible, or even likely occurences, a recogni-
tion of that by this Court could rise to a level that may justify criticism or official
concern but certainly not to the level that could be the basis of a bar for the en-
forcement of the applicable laws enacted by Congress to alleviate employment dis-
crimination.
United States v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 351 F. Supp. 1394, 1398 (E.D. Pa. 1972). See also
United States v. City of Milwaukee, 395 F. Supp. 725, 727 (E.D. Wis. 1975). "This Court is not
permitted to allow the strong public interest and Congressional policy in this area to be frus-
trated by such logic and manipulation of 'equitable' defenses." Id.
24. 5 U.S.C. § 7153 (1966) replaced 5 U.S.C. § 633(2)9 (1948) during the 1966 recodifica-
tion of Civil Service Law. The first executive proclamation of a fair employment policy for
handicapped individuals came in a memorandum from Harris Ellsworth to heads of executive
departments and agencies (May 16, 1957).
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national origin and sex. 2 5  Despite this long standing policy, there
currently exists no clear judicial remedy for handicapped individuals.
The following discussion will explore the maze of potential causes
of action based upon the newly enacted equal opportunity proce-
dures, Section 501 and the plethora of regulations contained in fed-
eral civil service law.
A. Utilizing The Appeals System
For Complaints Of Discrimination
After three decades of forboarance, the angelic statements of the
federal government were transformed into action this year with the
establishment of an appeals system for hearing complaints of dis-
crimination based upon physical or mental handicap. 26 These proce-
dures, however, are not a panacea for ensuring that federal agencies
well be held accountable for discriminatory actions. The authority for
bringing private litigation is left in doubt by the regulations 27 and a
number of substantive provisions are less than satisfactory.
In response to the publication of proposed rules by the Civil Serv-
ice Commission 28 a number of organizations representing handi-
capped individuals filed formal comments protesting the lack of sub-
stantive regulations defining discrimination. 2 9  The final regulations
took a more substantive approach by defining "qualified handicapped
25. Equal employment opportunity procedures were first established for individuals alleg-
ing discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion and natural origin in 1966. 31 C.F.R. §
3069 (1966). In 1967, similar protections were granted for individuals alleging sex discrimina-
tion. See 32 Fed. Reg. 15631 (1967).
26. 5 C.F.R. § 713 (G) (1978). Implementation of these regulations is furthered by Federal
Personnel Manual Letter 713-43 (Advance Edition March 30, 1978).
27. While the regulations incorporate complaints of discrimination on the basis of handicap-
ping condition into the existing equal employment opportunity procedures contained in 5
C.F.R. § 713(B) (1978), the Civil Service Commission specifically excludes incorporation of such
complaints into 5 C.F.R. §§ 713.281-283, 43 Fed. Reg. 12294 (1978). According to the Civil
Service Commission, court actions must necessarily proceed under "general jurisdictional stat-
utes." 43 Fed. Reg. 12293 (1978).
28. 5 C.F.R. § 713.701, 42 Fed. Reg. 46541 (1978).
29. See, e.g., Comments of the Institute for Public Interest Representation (filed December
15, 1977); Comments of the National Center for Law and the Handicapped, Inc. (filed De-
cember 12, 1977); Comments of the Ad Hoc Coalition on Employment of Handicapped Indi-
viduals in the Federal Government (filed December 7, 1977). See also LEADERSHIP CONFER-
ENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS: AN ASSESSMENT
OF THE FIRST YEAR (1978) which noted:
Finally, the [Civil Service] Commission while acting last September to issue a
long promised rule to protect handicapped persons from job discrimination in the
federal government, did not take adequate action. Its proposed rule, apart from
establishing a complaint procedure, amounted to little more than a policy declara-
tion against discrimination, failing to specify practices that constitute discrimination
1054
1978] FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 1055
person," 30 expanding upon the definition of "reasonable accommoda-
tion," 31 prohibiting discriminatory selection criteria, 32 and adding a
new section on physical access to buildings. 33 The final regulations,
however, on the issue of pre-employment inquiries, 34 provide for
only limited retroactivity 35 and contain no affirmative action require-
ments. 3
6
. Reflecting its traditional indolence in attacking employment dis-
crimination against handicapped individuals,3 7 the equal employment
opportunity procedures are insufficient to implement Congressional
goals. Although they augment the substantive and procedural rights
of handicapped individuals, they are but another component of an
increasingly complex regulatory scheme. Because they do not define
the sole mechanism available to aggrieved individuals, ultimate relief
or to give guidance to employers on the reasonable accommodation they must make
in hiring and promoting handicapped persons.
Id. at 18.
30. 5 C.F.R. § 713.702(f) 43 Fed. Reg. 12295 (1978).
31. Id. § 713.704.
32. Id. § 713.705.
33. Id. § 713.707.
34. Id. § 713.706. This section is considerably weaker, if not more confising, than the
parallel sections in the Section 503 and 504 regulations. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6 (1977); 45
C.F.R. § 84.14 (1977). The Civil Service Regulation begins in a manner similar to the Section
504 approach by prohibiting pre-employment inquiries concerning an individual's handicapping
condition. See 5 C.F.R. § 713.706(a) (1978). The regulation then permits the agency to make
pre-employment inquiries "to meet the medical qualification requirements," Id. The Civil Serv-
ice Commission equates the "medical qualifications requirements" with the "minimum abilities
necessary for safe and efficient performance of the duties of the position... " Id. However,
this equation is not likely to be adhered to in practice because of reliance upon HANDBOOKS
X-118 and X-119 which unduly screen out qualified handicapped individuals. See notes 13-18
supra.
35. See 5 C.F.R. § 713.709(b) (1978). Instead of requiring agencies to process complaints of
discrimination based on acts or actions which occurred subsequent to September 26, 1973, the
effective date of the Rehabilitation Act, the Civil Service Commission compromised the intent
of Congress by only requiring retroactivity for one year prior to the effective date of the regula-
tions. Id. Even this limited retroactivity will not comprehensively permit all such complaints to
be heard. The new regulations require coverage only when a complaint is brought to the atten-
tion of the agency within 30 days of the discriminatory act and only if the complaint was not
adjudicated under some internal procedure. Id. Partial relief from this arbitrary decision is
sought in a Petition for Rulemaking which is now pending with the Civil Service Commission.
Petition of Juanita Parker, (filed April 7, 1978). The Petition, filed pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 553(e)
(1976), seeks retroactive application of the procedural regulations to all pending complaints. Id.
at 14.
36. Unlike the regulations implementing Section 503, the Civil Service did not outline
similar affirmative action responsibilities of employers such as outreach, positive recruitment,
external dissemination of policy, internal dissemination of policy, and responsibility for im-
plementation. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(f)-(h) (1977).
37. Continuing evidence of the lack of commitment by the federal government to a policy of
stringent enforcement of equal employment opportunity principles for handicapped individuals
is provided by the specific refusal of the Civil Service Commission, the Equal Employment
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from discriminatory practices, in many cases, may only result from
simultaneous reliance upon other causes of action.
B. Implying A Private Cause Of Action
Under Section 501
There has been a long standing public policy of promoting equal
employment opportunities for handicapped individuals. Nevertheless,
the lack of procedural mechanisms and the inefficiencies of the fed-
eral bureauracy have led many handicapped individuals to consider
Section 501 as a means of vindicating their rights. Although the stat-
ute lacks an express enunciation of a private cause of action, disabled
individuals have begun to enter the federal courts alleging a right to
litigate claims of employment discrimination under that statute. De-
spite the lack of effective alternative mechanisms for pursuing their
grievances, the judiciary, thus far, has been reluctant to accept these
claims .38
However, an analysis of the legislative history of Section 501, in
the context of the established Supreme Court test for implying a pri-
vate cause of action, 39 suggests that future decisions may recognize an
implied private right of action under Section 501. As with Sections
503 and 504, the implied cause of action test enunciated by the Su-
preme Court in Cort v. Ash, 40 is the focal point for assessing whether
Section 501 should be judicially interpreted to create a private cause
of action. 4 1  In Cort, four standards were established against which
the particular statute must be measured:
1. Is the Plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted" that is, does the statute create a federal right
in favor of the plaintiff?
2. Is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or im-
plicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?
Opportunity Commission, the Department of justice and the Department of Labor to include
handicapped individuals within the ambit of the proposed uniform guidelines on employee
selection procedures. See 42 Fed. Reg. 65542 (1977) proposing to amend 5 C.F.R. § 300 (1978);
29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1978); 28 C.F.R. § 50 (1978); 41 C.F.R. § 60-3 (1978).
38. See Coleman v. Darden, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6788 (D. Colo. 1977), rejecting an im-
plied cause of action under Section 501. Coleman is the first case to directly address the issue.
39. The Supreme Court first enunciated the concept of an implied cause of action in Texas
& Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916). In Texas & Pac. Ry., the Court relied heavily
upon reasoning which was later to become the first of the integral tests set forth in Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66 (1975): "A disregard of the command of this statute is a wrongful act, and where it
results in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the
right to recover the damages from the party in default is implied." 241 U.S. at 39.
40. 422 U.S. 66 (1974).
41. The leading case implying a private cause of action under Section 504, Lloyd v. Regional
Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977), relies heavily upon Cort. Similarly, the major
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3. Is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?
4. Is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law,
in an area basically the concern of the states, so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal
law? 42
A careful analysis of Section 501, in the context of the standards
enunciated in Cort, strongly supports the judicial creation of a private
cause of action.
1. Finding a Federal Right in Favor of Handicapped Individuals.
Section 501 specifically requires the promulgation of affirmative ac-
tion programs for handicapped individuals in each department,
agency and instrumentality of the federal government. 43  Addition-
ally, the Congressional "Declaration of Purpose" section of the
Rehabilitation Act specifically provides that the purpose of the Act is
to "promote and expand employment opportunities in the public and
private sectors for handicapped individuals and to place such individ-
uals in employment." 44
In addition to the explicit statutory requirements, the legislative
history clearly outlines a Congressional desire to ensure nondiscrim-
inatory employment policies in the federal government and estab-
lish the duties of federal agencies to provide for the special needs of
decisions under Section 503, although inconsistent in their holdings, rely upon the tests estab-
lished in Cort. See Moon v. Roadway Express, Inc., 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6508 (N.D. Ga. 1977)
(no private cause of action); Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (no
private cause of action found); Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D.
Pa. 1977) (private cause of action found). While Drennon was not appealed, Moon and Rogers
were both appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Moon and Rogers were consolidated on appeal by the
United States Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit on December 14, 1977. The briefs filed by
the parties rely heavily upon Corr.
42. 422 U.S. at 78.
43. 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (Supp. V 1975), provides:
Each department, agency and instrumentality (including the United States Postal
Service and the Postal Rate Commission) in the executive branch shall, within one
hundred and eighty days after September 26, 1973, submit to the Civil Service
Commission and to the Committee an affirmative action program plan for the hir-
ing, placement, and advancement of handicapped individuals in such department,
agency or instrumentality. Such plan shall include a description of the extent to
which and methods whereby the special needs of handicapped employees are being
met. Such plans shall be updated annually, and shall be reviewed annually and
approved by the Commission, if the Commission determines, after consultation with
the Committee, that such plan provides sufficient assurances, procedures and com-
mitments to provide adequate hiring, placement, and advancement opportunities
for handicapped individuals.
44. 29 U.S.C. § 701(8) (Supp. V 1975).
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handicapped individuals. 45 The proposition that such individuals
form a class "for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted"
seems undeniable, and the first standard established in Cort is clearly
met. 46
2. Analyzing the Legislative History.
The second factor enunciated by the Supreme Court in Cort is
whether there is an "indication of legislative intent, either explicit or
implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one." 47  Although
the Rehabilitation Act contains no explicit or implicit reference to a
45. See notes 48-56 and accompanying text infra.
46. See Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1285 (7th Cir. 1977); Rogers v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200, 202 (N.D. Tex. 1977); Duran v. City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp.
75, 78 (M.D. Fla. 1977); Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Stpp. 809, 815 (E.D.
Pa. 1977).
47. 422 U.S. at 78. In its discussion of the second factor, the Supreme Court recognized
that the absence of an explicit or implicit indication of legislative intent would not necessarily
preclude an implied private cause of action. Justice Brennan, writing for the unanimous Court,
explained that:
in situations in which it is clear that federal law has granted a class of persons
certain rights, it is not necessary to show an intent to create a private cause of
action ... an explicit purpose to deny such a cause of action would be controlling.
Id. at 82.
Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977) relied heavily upon
the language in Cort to the effect that the lack of an explicit or implicit approval of a private
cause of action would not necessarily negate the possibility of finding such a private cause of
action. Id. at 815. Drennon held that Section 503 creates a private cause of action, despite the
fact that the legislative history which anticipated and approved the inclusion of a private right of
action as a means of enforcement for Section 504 did not mention Section 503. Id.
The Congressional Record suggests that Congress specifically intended the inclusion of a pri-
vate right of action tinder Section 504:
This approach to implementation of Section 504 which closely follows the models of
the above cited antidiscrimination provisions [i.e. Section 601 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d(1), and Section 901 of the Education Amendments of
1972, 42 U.S.C. 1683], would ensure administrative due process (right to hearing,
right to review) provide for administrative consistency with the Federal government
as well as relative ease of implementation and permitting judicial remedy through a
private action.
120 CONG. REC. 30534 (1973).
Section 501, like Section 503, does not have a legislative history which specifically anticipates
the "judical remedy through a private action" which was contemplated for Section 504. Thus,
the rationale of the Drennon court is particularly germane to the analysis tinder Section 501.
Although not as detailed, the decision in Duran v. City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp. 75 (N.D.
Fla. 1977) is also significant. In Duran, the court considered the plaintiff's motion for prelimi-
nary injunction under a complaint alleging violations of Section 503, Section 504 and the Four-
teenth Amendment. In considering whether the plaintiff had met his burden of proof with
regard to showing a substantial likelihood of prevailing upon the merits, the court said: "a
thorough analysis of the sparse case law in this area indicates that the plaintiff does have sub-
stantial likelihood he will prevail on the merits .... " Id. at 77. While treating the plaintiff's
claims tinder Sections 503 and 504 as one, the court held that "the plaintiff's second claim ...is
meritorious." Id. at 78.
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private cause of action, the legislative history, 48 when read as a
whole, evidences an intent to provide handicapped individuals with
"the right to employment which compliments their abilities and
which represents avenues of restitution for previous societal ne-
glect." 49 Having taken substantial evidence concerning the extent of
employment discrimination facing handicapped individuals, 50 Con-
gress clearly intended that the required affirmative action program
plans would provide a working mechanism for combatting employ-
ment discrimination.
Thus, while Section 501, by its express statutory language, might
be interpreted to require only the filing of affirmative action program
plans, the legislative history makes clear that Congress intended that
Section 501 create strong substantive rights for handicapped
employees and applicants for employment. The Senate Committee on
48. Undoubtedly, the legislative history under Section 501 should play an important role in
determining whether a private cause of action is to be implied under the statute. Traditionally,
committee reports, statements of committee members, and statements of the sponsors or draf-
tors of legislation are utilized in determining the meaning of legislation. See generally National
Woodwork Mfgrs. Ass'n. v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967); Mitchell v. Kentucky Finance Co., 359
U.S. 290 (1959); United States v. United Mineworkers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); United States v.
American Trucking Ass'ns., 310 U.S. 534 (1940); United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554
(1940).
The lack of any apparent reference to the legislative history in Coleman v. Darden, 13 Empl.
Prac. Dec. 6788 (D. Colo. 1977), renders that decision negating a private cause of action under
Section 501 somewhat questionable.
49. S. REP. No. 48, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1974). Elsewhere in the legislative history, the
Senate Committee states that:
For those millions of handicapped individuals who pay taxes and have the right to
expect that their tax money will go toward making their environment more accessi-
ble and employment easier, the creation of a compliance mechanism to eliminate
architectural barriers and of an affirmative action program to insure that they have
the right to employment which compliments their abilities represents overdue av-
enue of restitution for previous societal neglect.
S. REP. No. 48, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1974).
The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare concluded its report by emphasizing
that: "The bill requires that there be established a committee which will initiate an affirmative
action plan for and seek to insure that there is no discrimination in the employment of hand-
icapped individuals by and within the agency of the Federal Government in hiring, placement,
or advancement." Id. at 51.
50. In detailing the "History of H.R. 8395 and S. 7," the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare Report indicates that extensive testimony was taken. In highlighting the par-
ticular problems which were raised during the hearings, the Committee found one problem to
be "the lack of action in areas related to rehabilitation which limit a handicapped individual's
ability to function in society. E.g., employment discrimination .. " S. REP. No. 93-318, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEwVS 2078.
Elsewhere in the legislative history, the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
noted that:
Individuals with handicaps are all too often excluded from schools and educational
programs, barred from employment or are under-employed because of archaic at-
titudes and laws, denied access to transportation, buildings and housing because of
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:1047
Labor and Public Welfare enunciated its clear expectation that the
Civil Serice Commission "carry out vigorously" 5 1 its respon-
sibilities. 52
Perhaps the most incisive statement of the legislative purposes be-
hind Title V of the Rehabilitation Act was made by Senator Williams
during the 1976 Oversight Hearings:53
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was the first major step to change
what had gone on before to bring the force of the Federal Gov-
ernment to bear in remedying discrimination against handicapped
persons.
There are three important provisions of this law which were de-
signed to correct some of the major problems: ...
[T]o require that the Federal Government itself act as the model
employer of the handicapped and take affirmative action to hire
and promote the disabled, we enacted Section 501 of the Act.
54
architectural barriers and lack of planning, and are discriminated against by public
laws which frequently exclude individuals with handicaps or fail to establish appro-
priate enforcement mechanisms.
S. REP. No. 1139, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1974).
51. S. REP. No. 93-318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1973).
52. The Senate Committee concludes one Report by stating:
Hearings in the 92nd Congress on Vocational Rehabilitation pointed out that de-
spite the Civil Service Commission's experience and actions in this area, Federal
employment policies with regard to handicapped individuals continue to be found
wanting. The Committee emphasized that the Federal Government must be an
equal opportunity employer, and that this equal opportunity must apply fully to
handicapped individuals. The Committee, therefore, expects the CSC to insure that
there is no discrimination in employment for handicapped individuals within the
Federal Government, and to make all necessary steps to insure that the special
needs of handicapped individuals are met.
Id. at 49.
53. Senator Williams also eloquently described the extent of discrimination traditionally ex-
perienced 'by disabled Americans:
Abraham Lincoln once characterized America as "a nation conceived in liberty
and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal ....
And it was not until 1964 that the Congress finally enacted legislation to remedy
0 this denial of rights-the right to a job; the right to a decent educational opportun-
ity; the right to be served in a restaurant or ride in a bus; the right to participate on
an equal basis in federally assisted programs of every kind.
Three years ago the Congress acted to protect the rights of yet another minority
group in our society-the disabled.
For here, too, throughout the history of the United States, our approach was to
treat handicapped individuals either as helpless or hopeless-or both.
Rehabilitation of the Handicapped Programs 1976: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the
Handicapped of the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1502 (1976)
(hereinafter cited as Oversight Hearings).
54. Id.
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Senator Williams' concept of the federal government as a "model
employer" of the handicapped is consistent with Senator Stafford's
interpretation of his amendment to the original Senate bill which
brought about the inclusion of Section 501 in the Rehabilitation Act.
Noting that the original purpose of the Rehabilitation Act amend-
ments was to increase rehabilitation services, Senator Stafford indi-
cated that "[t]he hearings left a distinct impression on all members of
the committee that even with the training this bill provides, a more
affirmative approach was needed to assist the handicapped individ-
ual." 5 5  This "distinct impression" formed the basis for the amend-
ment-"to give special emphasis to the employment of handicapped
individuals within the programs of the Federal Government."
56
Further evidence of the favorable Congressional intent may be in-
ferred by the legislative decision to impose by statute, in Sections 501
and 503, affirmative action requirements rather than mere nondis-
crimination requirements. 57  Congress specifically went beyond the
nondiscrimination protections afforded other "protected classes" by
requiring affirnwtive action58 under Section 501. 59 Undeniably, af-
55. 119 CONG. REC. 8070 (1973). Senator Stafford's remarks were made in the context of a
proposed amendment to Section 503 which would have given the President the power to waive
the affirmative action requirements of Section 503 when such a waiver was in the national
interest. Although 29 U.S.C. § 793(c) ultimately granted a limited waiver, Senator Stafford's
remarks are germane to the Congressional intent in Section 501. Senator Stafford concluded his
statement with the following comment:
Quite frankly, if we in Congress are going to pass laws to help the handicapped
participate in society and believe that they can with the training that we will pro-
vide, then we do have the obligation to make sure that there is adequate and equal
opportunity for them to participate.
Id.
56. Id. Senator Stafford also indicated that "[w]e also established an Interagency Committee
on Employment of the Handicapped to help him better gain entry to the federal system." Id.
57. Although Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorized courts to enjoin unlawful
employment practices and "order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may
include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees . . . or any other equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate," Title VII did not mandate the full use of affirmative
action concepts for all employers subject to the protective legislative. Compare 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(g) (1975) with 29 U.S.C. §§ 791 and 793 (Stpp. V 1975).
58. The Department of Labor's interpretation of Section 503 and the judicial interpretations
of Executive Order 11,246, 3 C.F.R. § 169 (1974), support the proposition that the term "affir-
mative action" is a legal concept which goes beyond a neutral nondiscriminatory policy.
The Department of Labor has described the affirmative action duty as having "more extensive
an impact than the obligation to refrain from employment discrimination." U.S. DEPT. OF
LABOR, OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAM, TASK FORCE, PRELIMINARY
REPORT ON THE REVITALIZATION OF THE FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAM 15
(1977). Weldon Rogeau, Director of the Office of Contract Compliance programs stated in a
speech on June 8, 1977 that; "Under Section 503, we differentiate between non-discrimination
and affirmative action. The law requires affirmative action and non-discrimination, of course, as
part of it. But affirmative action is more than non-discrimination." 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH)
3096 (1977).
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firmative action has traditionally required a more active and extensive
effort than that required by non-discrimination. As a result, courts have
frequently imposed affirmative action obligations to eradicate the past
injustices of an employer's discrimination under Title VII. 60 There can
be no question that Congress was aware of past interpretations and
implementations of the term "affirmative action" when it enacted Sec-
tion 501.
Despite the lack of an explicit intent to deny a private cause of
action, it has been argued that the numerous attempts to amend Title
VII to include handicapped individuals within the ambit of the pro-
tected class 61 should be construed as evidence of a legislative intent
to deny such a private cause of action tinder the Rehabilitation
Act. 62 There is, however, no indication that these proposed Title VII
In interpreting Executive Order 11,246, former Attorney General John Mitchell expressed
the view that affirmative action substantively proscribes more than a concept of nondiscrimina-
tion. 42 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 37 (1969). The judiciary has interpreted Executive Order 11, 246 to
require the contractor to "'do more than simply refrain from discrimination." Mele v. United
States Dept. of Justice, 395 F. Supp. 592, 594 (D. N.J. 1975), aff'd and appeal dismissed sub
nom. Mele v. E.E.O.C., 532 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1976). The affirmative action concept "mandates
that employers go beyond passive non-discrimination, by taking positive steps toward elimina-
tion of employment barriers to minorities.'" Id. at 595. See also Contractors Ass'n. of Eastern
Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied 404 U.S. 854
(1971); Note, Executive Order 11,246: Anti-Discrimination Obligation in Government Contracts,
44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 590 (1969).
59. The emphasis of Section 501 on "affirmative action" as distinguished from the Section
504 statutory language of non-discrimination, again demonstrates the conscious exercise of
legislative intent by the Congress in its selection of statutory language. However, it should be
noted that there is legislative history toothe effect that Section 504 requires, .where necessary,
that affirmative action be taken. "Where applicable, Section 504 is intended to include a re-
quirement of affirmative action as well as a prohibition against a discrimination." S. REP. No.
93-1270, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 93-1457, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1977).
60. Under Title VII, "the obligation to take affirmative action imports more than the nega-
tive obligation not to discriminate." Southern Ill. Builders Ass'n. v. Ogilive, 471 F.2d 680, 684
(7th Cir. 1972). See also Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); Myers v. Gilman
Paper Corp., 544 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1977); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1974);
Local 53 Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969); See generally Note De-
velopments in the Law-Employment Discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1971). Affirmative action concepts under Title VII have included
the power of the federal courts to mandate that minority persons be hired on a specific ratio to
non-minorities until a requisite number of minority persons are hired. See, e.g., Carter v.
Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), modified on rehearing en bane, 452 F.2d 327, cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
61. In Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200 (N.D. Tex. 1977), the district court lists
33 proposed amendments which "have never mustered sufficient support for passage." H.R.
264, 461, 1107, 1200, 1995, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 1311, 1757, H.R. 1346, 1886, 2515,
3497, 4624, 4625, 5016, 7061, 7754, 7758, 7946, 8028, 8417, 12,541, 94th Cong., (1975-75); S.
1780, H.R. 1120, 3685, 10,960, 11,986, 11,987, 12,654, 12,916, 13,199, 13,200, 93d Cong.,
(1973-74); H.R. 10,962, 92d Cong., (1972). 433 F. Supp. at 202.
62. In Rogers the district court held that the existence of numerous unsuccessful efforts to
amend Title VII, when considered with the explicit grant of a private administrative remedy in
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Amendments are evidence of such an intent. Conceptually, these
p'roposed amendments may be designed to accomplish any number of
Congressional policies which are unrelated to the issue of a private
cause of action.6 3
There is some evidence that the amendments to Title VII were
proposed in order to extend the prohibitions against employment dis-
crimination to a substantially broader class of employers than those
covered under the Rehabilitation Act. Whereas the Rehabilitation
Act, in its entirety, reaches only federal agencies, federal contractors
and subcontractors, and federally assisted programs, an amendment
to Title VII would proscribe employment discrimination against the
handicapped by a substantially larger number of employers. 64
Senator Humphrey, a sponsor of the original attempt to amend Ti-
tles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act to include protections for
handicapped individuals, made clear that his primary concern was the
prohibition against employment discrimination found in the legislation
rather than the specific mechanisms provided for remedying such dis-
crimination. 65  Senator Humphrey later reemphasized his approval of
Section 503, calls for the conclusion "that Congress did not intend to bestow a private right to
bring suit in court upon qualified handicapped employees." Id. at 202. This reasoning was
followed in Moon v. Roadway Express, Inc., 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6508 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
63. For example, the proposed amendments may represent nothing more than a predomin-
ant objective of centralizing the civil rights statutes under the ambit of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission.
64. Under Title VII the term "employer" means "a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceeding calendar year, and any agent of such a person."
However, the term employer does not include "(1) the United States, a corporation wholly
owned by the Government of the United States, an Indian Tribe, or any department or agency
of the District of Columbia subject by statute to procedures of the competitive service (as
defined in Section 2102 of Title V), or (2) a bona fide private membership club (other than a
labor organization) which is exempt from taxation tinder Section 501(c) of Title 26, except that
during the first year after March 24, 1972, persons having fewer than twenty-five employees
(and their agents) shall not be considered employers." 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e(b) (Supp. V 1975).
65. In his statement with regard to the placement of these rights in the Rehabilitation Act,
as opposed to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Senator Humphrey stated:
(T]his bill correctly emphasized the need to serve more severely handicapped indi-
viduals, to make services responsive and to make every effort to enable handicap-
ped persons to lead a productive and financially independent life.
I welcome the additional requirement in this bill for an affirmative action pro-
gram tinder which Federal contractors shall undertake to employ and advance in
employment qualified handicapped individuals. Moreover, another section of this
bill specifically prohibits discrimination against an otherwise qualified handicapped
or severely handicapped individual, solely by reason of his or her handicap, result-
ing in that person being excluded from participation in, or denied the benefits of,
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
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the placement of substantive rights in the Rehabilitation Act, in lieu
of the Civil Rights Act, again stressing that the primary objective of
his original bill was to prohibit employment discrimination. 66
The proposition that subsequent attempts to amend Title VII are
primarily designed to prohibit private discrimination, which remains
unregulated by the Rehabilitation Act, is supported by Congressman
Dodd's testimony during the 1976 Oversight Hearings. In explaining
his purpose in proposing an amendment to Title VII, Congressman
Dodd related his concern for the expansion of the substantive obliga-
tions to private employers. 67 Thus, the argument that proposed Title
I am deeply gratified at the inclusion of these provisions, which carry through
the intent of the original bills which I introduced jointly with the Senator from
lllinois[Mr. Percy] in the last Congress, S.3044 and S.3458, to anwnd, respectively,
Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to guarantee the right of persons
with a mental or physical handicap to participate in programs receiving Federal
assistance and to make discrimination in employment because of these handicaps,
and in the absence of a bona fide occupational qualification, an unlawful employ-
ment practice. The time has come to firmly establish the right of these Americans
o dignity and self-respect as equal and contributing members of society and to end
the virtual isolation of millions of children and adults from society.
119 CONG. REc. 635 (1973) (emphasis added).
Although the original bills did not include a parallel to Section 501, it is clear from Senator
Humphrey's statement that his primary intent in proposing amendments to Title VII revolved
around the substantive protections from employment discrimination which would be granted.
No mention is made of the issue of a private cause of action, and no legitimate inference can be
made that the failure of Senator Humphrey's original bills to "muster sufficient support for
passage" implies a negative intent on the part of the Congress.
66. Senator Humphrey referred to the proposed Rehabilitation Act Amendments as "an im-
portant step toward fulfilling the intent of my bill to prohibit discrimination in employment
solely on the basis of handicaps and in the absence of a bona fide occupational qualification. 119
CONG. REC. 6145 (1973). With regard to the amendment which was later to become Section
504, Senator Humphrey commented: "The bill which I sponsored would have amended Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to establish this protection." Id. As shown in his earlier state-
ment, Senator Humphrey's overriding concern continued to be for the substantive protections,
rather than for the procedural mechanisms. Again, no reference is made to the issue of a private
cause of action.
67. It is my belief that we as a nation have been grossly negligent in failing to eradi-
cate the barriers of discrimination which the mentally and physically handicapped
face in the public and private sectors in our society. The Rehabilitation Act of
1973 stands as an affirmative step by the Congress to remove these discriminatory
barriers at least from the federal government, the Federal Contractors and recipients
of federal financial assistance.
However, we must go beyond the protections afforded the handicapped in the
Rehabilitation Act and prohibit private discrimination in the areas of employment,
architectural barriers, housing and transportation.
To this end, last year I introduced legislation to prohibit discrimination against
the mentally and physically disabled in the House in employment; and last fall I
conducted extensive hearings on private employment discrimination to develop a
background on the problems the handicapped face in this area.
Oversight Hearings, supra note 53, at 321-22.
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VII amendments evidence a Congressional intent to exclude private
causes of action under the Rehabilitation Act is too speculative be-
cause it ignores more palpable possibilities for explaining legislative
purpose.
Even assuming that the legislative history of the attempted
amendments to Title VII had shown that a primary purpose was to
provide handicapped individuals with a private cause of action, that
showing would not bear upon the issue of whether the court should
imply a private cause of action under Section 501. Since such a
showing would not be based upon specific legislative history in the
Rehabilitation Act disapproving of a private cause of action, no legiti-
mate inferrence could be drawn concerning the legislative intent be-
hind Section 501.
Although there is no specific indication of a legislative intent to
allow a private cause of action under Section 501, there is, more im-
portantly, no indication of a disapproval of such private actions. When
viewed in its entirety, the legislative history calls for the establish-
ment of forceful, affirmative rights for handicapped individuals.
Moreover, the very purpose of the judicially-created policy of implied
causes of action is to provide individuals with the full benefit of the
statutory rights afforded by Congress. 68
Where there is no clear indication of legislative intent to deny or
allow a private remedy, the decision of a federal court should be
based upon the three remaining Cort considerations. 9 The concept
of an implied cause of action has been developed by the judiciary,
specificially as a means of providing aggrieved individuals with a pro-
cess for obtaining relief in the absence of an enunciated private rem-
edy in the statute.
3. Considering the Legislative Scheme
The third Cort consideration, requiring an assessment of whether
the creation of an implied private cause of action is consistent with
the underlying pruposes of the legislative scheme, is perhaps the
most important of the four Cort considerations. In J.I. Case Company
68. See notes 94-97 infra.
69. Mason v. Belieu, 543 F.2d 215, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 852 (1976).
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v. Borak,70 the Supreme Court created an implied private cause of
action under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.71 In that case, the
Court held that although the Act did not expressly provide for a pri-
vate right of action, permitting such relief was appropriate when
necessary to achieve the legislative purposes. 72 In creating an im-
plied cause of action, Borak established that "it is the duty of the
courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make
effective the Congressional purpose." 73 Borak was recently followed
in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries 74 in which the Court, citing Borak
and Superintendent of Insurance v.. Bankers Life & Casualty Coin-
pany, 75 held that the essential test for determining whether a private
cause of action should be implied to a particular statute is the deter-
mination of whether such an implication is necessary to effectuate the
Congressional purposes. 76
Given the legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act, which is re-
plete with strong indications of the prevailing public policy to pro-
hibit employment discrimination, an obligation is placed on the
judiciary to insure that the intended objectives of Congress are
realized through the implication of a private cause of action under
Section 501. Notwithstanding the enactment of the Civil Service
Commission's appeals system for handicapped individuals, 77 the need
for a private cause of action continues. That need is based upon the
tremendous extent to which employment discrimination against dis-
70. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
72. 377 U.S. at 432.
73. Id. at 433.
74. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
75. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
76. 430 U.S. at 26. Prior to the further explanation of Borak by the Piper Court, Justice
Harlan analyzed the Borak decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S.
388 (1971).
The Borak case is an especially clear example of the exercise of federal judicial
power to accord damages as an appropriate remedy in the absence of any expressed
statutory authorization of a federal cause of action. There we "implied"-from what
can only be characterized as an "exclusively procedural provision" affording access
to a federal forum . . . a private cause of action for damages. . . . We did so in an
area where federal regulation has been singularly comprehensive and elaborate ad-
ministrative enforcement machinery had been provided. The exercise of judicial
power involved in Borak simply cannot be justified in terms of statutory construc-
tion . . . nor did the Borak Court purport to do so. . . . The notion of "implying" a
remedy, therefore, as applied to cases like Borak, can only refer to a process
whereby the federal judiciary exercises a choice among traditionally available judi-
cial remedies according to reasons related to the substantive social policy embodied
in an act of positive law.
Id. at 402 n.4 (citations omitted).
77. See notes 26-37 and accompanying text supra.
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abled individuals has interwoven itself into the very fabric of federal
employment practices. Even with the availability of these equal
employment opportunity procedures, the application of the maxim
expressio unis est exclusio78 to deny a private cause of action would
be improper.79
One additional factor which is relevant to the determination of the
third Cort test is the need for consistency in decisions interpreting
the various provisions of Title V of the Rehabilitation Act. The finding
of an implied cause of action under Section 501 is clearly consistent
with the majority of courts which have found such implied causes of
action under Sections 503 and 504 of the Act. 80 If a private remedy
is not implied under Section 501, federal agencies, departments and
instrumentalities will be permitted to continue their undaunted prac-
tice of discriminatory actions, while federal contractors and federally
assisted programs will be subject to judicially mandated compliance
with the law.
78. One source gives the following definition: "Expression of one thing to the exclusion of
another. . . .Under this maxim, if a statute specifies one exception to a general rule or assumes
to specify the effects of a certain provision, other exceptions or effects are excluded.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 692 (4th ed. 1968) (citations omitted).
79. In Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Stipp. 200, 202 (N.D. Tex. 1977) the court relied
upon National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n. of R. RPassengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974),
in applying this maxim to Section 503. In National, however, the maxim was applied because of
the existence of explicit legislative history denying a cause of action. Because no intent to deny
a private cause of a~tion is indicated in the legislative history of Section 503, the maxim was
improperly applied to Section 503 in Rogers.
In light of National and the doctrine expressed in Cort, it is apparent that the maxim is also
inapplicable to Section 501. See also Allen v. State Board of Election, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
80. An expanding number of courts have either explicitly recognized a private cause of ac-
tion under Section 504 or have afforded the plaintiff relief tinder the statute. See Davis v.
Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978), rehearing denied, No. 77-
1237 (4th Cir. June 29, 1978); Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1977); United Hand-
icapped Fed'n. v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977); Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296
(2d Cir. 1977); Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977): Duran v. City
of Tampa, 430 F. Supp. 75 (M.D. Fla. 1977): Bartels v. Biernat, 427 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Wis.
1977); Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Hairston v.
Drosic:, 423 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. W. Va. 1976); Sites v. McKenzie, 423 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D.
W. Va. 1976); Rhode Island Soc'y for Autistic Children v. Board of Regents, C.A. No. 5081
(D.R.I. August 1, 1975); Silverstein v. Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth, 559 P.2d 716 (Colo.
App. 1976).
Although there is less uniformity on the implied private right of action issue under Section
503, even those cases finding no private right of action address only the issue of the individuals
right to proceed in court either concurrently with or in lieu of exhausting the available adminis-
trative remedies, and they do not necessarily restrict an individual's private right of action once
the administrative proceedings have been completed. Compare Duran, 430 F. Supp. 75 (N.D.
Fla. 1977) and Drennon, 428 F. Supp. 809, (E.D. Pa. 1977) finding a private right of action,
with Wood v. Diamond State Tel. Co., 440 F. Supp. 1003 (D. Del. 1977); Moon v. Roadway
Express, 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6508 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp.
200 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
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Not only would such a situation be contrary to the legislative
scheme, but the federal government would become the antithesis of
the "model employer of the handicapped" which Congress intended.
The necessity for implying a private cause of action under Section 501
is evidenced by the defense posited by the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) in Coleman v. Darden."l In Cole-
man, the defendants argue that, while Section 504 probably can be
held to create an implied private cause of action,82 Section 501 should
not. 83 By then arguing that federal agencies are not "federally assisted
programs" within the meaning of Section 504,84 the defendants were
able to assert that they are without any adjudicable responsibility to
handicapped individuals.
Two ironies evolve from the defense posited by the EEOC. The
first is that this super-agency, whose mission is the enforcement of
nondiscrimination legislation for other "protected classes," seeks in-
sulation from the charges of employment discrimination asserted by
handicapped individuals. The EEOC, which during the pendency of.
this lawsuit reported a total of only 15 handicapped individuals out of
2,290 total employees,8 5 has taken a position which is facially incon-
sistent with its raison d'etre.
The second irony is that the EEOC, which has frequently
applauded imaginative judicial approaches taken to support and ex-
pand the legislative design of eliminating employment discrimination
for other "protected classes," argues in Coleman for a narrow ap-
proach which is diametrically opposed to that legislative design. 8 6
81. 13 Emp. Prac. Dec. 6788 (D. Colo. 1977), appeal pending, No. 77-133 (10th Cir. 1978).
82. Brief for Appellee, Coleman v. Darden, No. 77-1133 (10th Cir. 1978) at 15 n.6.
83. Id. at 17-20.
84. The weight of authority on this issue appears to support the proposition that federal
agencies, departments and instrumentalities are not recipients of federal financial assistance as
that term is used in the Rehabilitation Act. The term "federal financial assistance," as defined
by those federal agencies administering 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1, does not include federal agencies.
See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 15.2 (1977) (Department of Agriculture), 28 C.F.R. § 42.101 (1977) (De-
partment of Justice). See also Dossen v. United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development, 428 F. Supp. 328 (N.D. Ca. 1976). The definition of "federal financial assitance"
promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare for the implementation of
Section 504 is consistent with the approaches taken with regard to 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 in that
it implicitly excludes federal agencies. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(h) (1977).
85. 1977 CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION REPORT Appendix D, at ix (1976).
86. In an address given at the Symposium sponsored by the Equal Employment Opportun-
ity Commission in Observance of the 10th Anniversary of the agency at Rutgers School of Law
November 28, 1975, Professor Cornelius J. Peck summarized this position.
From an administrative point of view, the most significant development in the
10-year history of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has
been the demonstration that, at least with regard to certain subjects, courts may be
trusted to give novel legislation an extensive and favorable development which tra-
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Concededly the defendants should not be foreclosed from raising any
justiciable defense. Nevertheless the employment practices of the
EEOC, with regard to handicapped individuals, when juxtaposed
against the express purpose of the agency, serve to highlight the criti-
cal need which handicapped individuals have for a judicial forum in
which to pursue their grievances.
4. The Applicability of State Law
The fourth Cort test requires an assessment of whether the
cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law.8 7 Because
the federal government is supreme within its proper sphere,88 there
can be little question that Section 501 meets the fourth test for
determining whether a private cause of action should be implied. The
states are unquestionably without constitutional power to regulate
employment discrimination by the federal government.
5. The Need for Judicial Intervention Under Section 501.
Although Cort has served as the focal point for the analysis of the
private right of action issue, the Supreme Court's more recent em-
phasis in Piper upon the interrelationship between the private right
of action and the Congressional goals must not be overlooked.8 9 The
courts must be called upon to effectuate the intent and purpose of
Section 501.90
ditional learning suggests can be obtained only through the administrative process.
Courts in this traditional view are neutral, uncommitted,' and bereft of the passion
required to proliferate creatively the policies of legislation which depart from the
status quo. They insist upon technicalities which frustrate the purpose of the new
law. Creative development of legislative policies requires, therefore, an unjudicial
sympathy, enthusiasm, and a commitment to extension of statutory language to
achieve its maximum affect. Courts have demonstrated that in the field of equal
employment opportunities they may rival if not excel the administrative process and
the sensitive and creative treatment of statutory language. Moreover, instead of
hostility, EEOC has received support from the judiciary which greatly strengthens
the effectiveness of the administrative process.
Peck, The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: Development in the Adminstrative Pro-
cess 1965-1975, 51 WASH. L. REV. 831 (1976).
87. 422 U.S. at 84.
88. See Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441 (1943); Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51
(1920); United States v. Weiserbloom, 168 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1948); 81 C.J.S. Social Security
and Public Welfare § 7 (1977).
89. See notes 70-76 and accompanying text supra.
90. Justice Douglas has poetically described the injustice which occurs when the judiciary
fails to fulfill its responsibility of protecting and furthering the Congressional goals through the
implication of necessary private causes of action:
The Court is in the mood to close all possible doors to judicial review so as to let
the existing bureaucracies roll on to their goal of administrative absolutism. When
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The necessity for favorable judicial action is based upon the en-
trenched nature and pervasive extent of discrimination in federal
agencies. Senator Williams has forcefully expressed the severity of the
problem:
We are concerned that there has been little progess in hiring
and promoting disabled persons by federal contractors and by the
Federal Government itself; ... and that the rights of millions of
handicapped individuals have been allowed to suffocate as a result
of inadequate public educational programs about these rights.
91
Frankly, I think that the time for excuses has now passed, we
don't have the time to listen to why it is so difficult to enforce the
basic rights of American people-whether or not they happen to
have the handicapping condition. 92
Handicapped individuals are a valuable resource to our nation, but
the full and fair utilization of their skills cannot occur until discrimina-
tion ceases. As a recent commentator has noted, protective legislation
has not been a panacea for handicapped individuals because the re-
cent legislation has seen little or no effective enforcement.
93
It is not uncommon for federal courts to fashion federal law where
federal rights are concerned. 94  The courts which hear cases Linder
Section 501 should take cognizance of the familiar canon of statutory
interpretation that remedial legislation should be construed broadly to
effectuate its purposes. 95 By definition, the very nature of implied
victims of administrative banility or administrative caprice are not allowed even to
be heard, the abuses of the monsters we have created will become intolerable. The
separation of powers was designed to provide, not for judicial supremacy, but for
checks and balances.
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n. of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453
(1974) (Douglas J. dissenting).
91. Courts, in considering the issue of an implied cause of action tinder Section 501, should
assess not only the affect of an adverse decision upon the access of handicapped individuals to
judicial relief, but also as to the potential affect for retarding the use of agency complaint proce-
dures. Senator Williams is properly concerned over the inadequacy of public educational pro-
grams about the rights intended under Section 501. The lack of such programs has an incaluable
negative effect upon the Congressional goals. The implication of a private right of action under
Section 501 would clearly enunciate judicial support for the public policy and would increase
not only the viability, but the visability, of the statute.
92. Oversight Hearings, supra note 53, at 1502-03. During the Oversight Hearings, Con-
gressman Dodd also testified that, despite the existence of Title V, "there has been little elimi-
nation against discrimination against the handicapped. This is a result of . . . a lack of enforce-
ment by the Federal Government of these sections." Id. at 321-22.
93. Achtenberg, Legal Aid for the Disabled: an Overview, SAN FERN. L. REV. 161, 171
(1975).
94. Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 457
(1957).
95. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
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causes of action calls upon the judiciary to respond to a social pro-
blem which has been legislatively defined, but for which Congress
has failed to establish procedures that insure full compliance with its
goals. With regard to Section 501, the courts are in an excellent posi-
tion to assess the need for supplemental relief. Moreover, they
should not hesitate to imply a cause of action under the statute which
will increase the likelihood of compliance with the Congressional
purpose. 96 The judiciary not only has the power, but also the duty,
to provide such remedies as are necessary to effectuate the statute's
goals. 97
C. Other Statutory and Regulatory Causes of Action
Thus far, Section 501 has not been addressed frequently98 nor
authoriatively by the federal courts. Nevertheless, a number of courts
have analyzed the rights of physically and mentally handicapped in-
dividuals under both Section 7153 of the United States Code and the
maze of regulations and procedures outlined in the Administrative
Title of the Code of Federal Regulations 99 and the Federal Personnel
Manual.
Although the case law in this area is by no means uniform, there is
a cognizable trend of giving a liberal construction to the relevant pro-
visions of the regulatory scheme in order to further the rights of
handicapped individuals in federal employment. The achievement of
the Congessional goal of prohibiting employment discrimination can
perhaps best be pursued through an implied cause of action under
Section 501 and through the development of consistent case law
under that statute. Nevertheless, the generally favorable case law
arising tinder the federal regulations will continue to play an impor-
96. See generally Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77
HARV. L. REv. 285, 291 (1963).
97. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. at 433, cited with approval in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
at 84.
98. The lengthy periods of time required to litigate claims under the facts of several of the
cases helps to explain why there has been a relatively small number of decisions tinder Section
501 when compared with the amount of litigation decided under Section 504. Compare note 38
supra with note 80 supra. The relative inactivity of aggrieved federal employees and applicants
should not be misconstrued as evidencing non-discriminatory federal employment practices.
Rather, the paucity of litigation more appropriately reflects the attempts which aggrieved in-
dividuals have made to work within the agency structure. If the judiciary ultimately responds
favorably to cases filed tinder Section 501, it should be anticipated that handicapped individuals
will correspondingly increase their utilization of that statute to escape the frequently unwork-
able administration structire.
99. 5 C.F.R. §§ 1.1 -2515.20 (1977).
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tant part in the development of substantive rights for handicapped
individuals. A major drawback, however, in placing primary emphasis
upon the federal regulations is the sheer complexity of these bureau-
cratic inventions. 100 Moreover, inconsistencies in the case law add to
the confision, and lengthy periods of time have been required for
exhaustion of administrative processes. Additionally the ultimate role
of the courts has been limited frequently to judicial review.
Ryan v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.,l10 Smith v. Fletcher, 10 2
and McNutt v. Hills, 10 3 illustrate the difficulties encountered when
courts rely upon administrative procedures to effectuate relief for
handicapped individuals alleging federal employment discrimination.
The Ryan court found that the plaintiff's allegations of employment
discrimination on the basis of physical handicap under Section 7153,
Section 501 and federal regulations and policies 104 failed to state a
cause of action. 10 5  Although also holding that the plaintiff had failed
to exhaust available administrative procedures, 10 6 the trial court, in
dismissing the plaintiff's complaint, directed the federal defendant to
make available all applicable administrative processes to the plain-
tiff. 10 7 Thus, while granting the defendant's motion to dismiss, the
District Court sought to insure that the plaintiff's substantive rights
were not totally ignored as a result of the adverse decision.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit specifically refused to decide whether Section 501,
Section 7153 or Section 713.401 of the Code of Federal Regulations
afford a basis for the implication of a private right of action. Never-
theless, the Court stated "it is clear to us that the quoted provisions
impose a duty upon federal agencies to structure their procedures
100. See, e.g., discussion of Doe v. Hampton, 556 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1977), at notes 130-
140 and accompanying text infra.
101. No. 75-1904 (D.D.C. May 5, 1976) aff'd 565 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
102. 393 F. Supp. 1366 (S.D. Tex. 1975), aff'd and modified 559 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1977).
103. 426 F. Supp. 990 (D.D.C. 1977).
104. In addition to statutory and constitutional causes of action, the plaintiffs' Amended
Complaint for Injunction sought relief under "the regulations of the United States Civil Service
Commission: the regulations and Affirmative Action plan of the F.D.I.C. and Executive Orders
11480 and 11758." Ryan v. F.D.I.C., No. 75-1904 (D.D.C. May 5, 1976).
105. 1d.
106. The court specifically noted the failure of the plaintiff to exhaust existing F.D.I.C.
employee grievance procedures. The agency would have permitted the plaintiff to pursue her
allegations of discrimination on the basis of physical handicap. Id.
107. The court specifically referred to those administrative processes afforded by 5 C.F.R. §
713.401 (1978), the F.D.I.C. Employee Grievance Procedures and the F.D.I.C. Circular
2000.10).
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and programs to insure that handicapped individuals are afforded
equal opportunity in both job assignment and promotion." 1 0 8
Although essentially affirming the trial court's decision, the court of
appeals was careful to more fully assure the availability of an adminis-
trative process by indicating that, if the current procedures in the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation did not ultimately provide a
remedy for discrimination in promotion because of physical handicap,
the defendants "should" amend their procedures to so provide.' 0 9 Al-
though the court issued neither injunctive nor mandamus
relief, it indicated that an agency's failure to comply with its duty
would permit the aggrieved individual to seek judicial review of the
agency action.110
In Smith the trial court went substantially further than the Ryan
decision by actually adjudicating the plaintiff's substantive claims and
ordering individual relief under Section 713.401111 and specifically
requiring the Civil Service Commission to abide by the applicable
statutes and regulations. 112 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
relief granted by the trial court. 1 13 The appellate court, however,
108. Ryan v. F.D.I.C., 565 F.2d 762, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
109. Id. at 764.
110. Id. at 763. The Court of Appeals cited as jurisdictional authority 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)
(1976) and 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1966). In the final sentence of its Order, the Court of Appeals
also indicated that "if appellant is aggrieved by the action taken by the agency, she may seek
judicial review at that point." Id. at 764.
The Court of Appeals seems to be indicating that the right to seek judicial review would arise
in either of two situations: (1) if the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation failed to provide the
plaintiff with an appropriate mechanism; or (2) after the plaintiff exhausted the available
mechanism. This interpretation would be consistent with Judge Gesell's specific finding that the
plaintiff had failed to exhaust. Had Judge Gesell's Order dismissing the plaintiff's cause of action
been based upon a theory that she would, under no circumstances, have been entitled to judi-
cial review once an internal administrative process were made available, the issue of exhaustion
would not have been material to that holding.
111. 393 F. Supp. at 1369 (Finding of Fact No. 5). As in the Ryan appellate decision, the
trial court in Smith based its jurisdiction upon the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §
702 (1966). Id. (Conclusion of Law No. 4).
112. The trial court would have specifically enjoined the Commissioners of the Civil Service
Commission from:
a. [F]ailing to order separate and independent investigation of any complaint of
discrimination.
b. [R]efusing to include the issue of discrimination because of physical handicap
in the investigation of complaints of discrimination under Chapter 713 of the Fed-
eral Personnel Manual, 5 C.F.R. Part 713.
C. [F]ailing to instruct the hearing examiner to enforce all applicable regulations.
d. [F]ailing, upon review of the examiner's and agency's decisions, to enforce its
own regulation pertaining to discrimination on the basis of physical handicap.
Id. at 1370, (Conclusion of Law, No. 12).
113. Smith v. Fletcher, 559 F.2d 1014, 1019 (5th Cir. 1977).
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based its decision on a finding of sex discrimination under Title VII
rather than employment discrimination on the basis of disability. 114
As a result, the trial court's far-reaching holding was diluted by the
Fifth Circuit's modification. 115 The action taken by the trial court,
however, remains as a standard by which to measure the exercise of
judicial power.
Somewhere on the continuum between the decision in Ryan and
the trial court determination in Smith is the decision in McNutt
which also involved the denial of promotional opportunities on the
basis of handicap. The McNutt court fell short of the lower court's
determination in Smith by remanding the plaintiff's claim to the ad-
ministrative tribunal for an assessment of the relief to be granted
rather than merely ordering appropriate relief.116  However, McNutt
does go firther than the Ryan decision by establishing that the fed-
eral government has the burden of proving by "clearly convincing
evidence" that the individual would not have received the promotion
he or she applied for absent discrimination. 117  McNutt further or-
dered that the plaintiff's grievance be expedited.""
The Court in McNutt was obviously affected by the plaintiff's alle-
gations of blatant discrimination, which the government conceded to
be "inexcusable." 119 The relief granted was tantamount to class in-
114. The appellate court refused "the opportunity to create unnecessary dictum . . ." with
regard to the plaintiff's "interesting theory that federal employees claiming physical handicap
discrimination are in a position akin to that of federal employees claiming racial discrimination
.. . prior to the 1972 Amendments to Title VII. Id. at 1018 n.9.
115. The Fifth Circuit was probably not incorrect in finding that the sex and physical hand-
icap discrimination were "inexplicably entwined" tinder the facts presented. Id. at 1017. Clearly
one of the "key statements" evidencing discrimination which was made by one of the plaintiff's
supervisors highlights the dual illegality of the way in which she was perceived and treated by
her employer. "I know it would be very difficult for a young woman to travel all over the
country, getting in cabs, and airplanes, with a wheelchair." Id. at 1017. However, the Fifth Circuit
did not overrule any of the reasoning of the trial court, and the lower court's determination
stands as an example of the judiciary's desire to effectuate relief for handicapped individuals
who are met with discrimination by federal employment practices.
116. 426 F. Supp. 990, 1005 (D.D.C. 1977).
117. Id.
118. Id. The Court ordered that the administrative proceedings be completed within 120
days. Having found that the plaintiff was entitled only to prospective relief, the court sought to
insure that the plaintiff not be further prejudiced by admininstrative delay.
119. See id. at 994. For example, the grievance examiner found that the Director of the
Office of Congressional Services had said that he did not want McNutt, who was blind, to be
"wandering and stumbling aournd the halls of Congress." Id. at 1004-05 n.32. Additional evi-
dence of the overall lack of commitment to federal non-discrimination policies in the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development which may have spurred the court to provide liberal
relief was the statement of the Department's Director of Personnel to the effect that he was not
aware of the substance of the various regulations affecting handicapped employees in federal
service. Id. at 1006-07 n.38.
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junctive relief in that the court required the Department of Housing
and Urban Development to submit a comprehensive report specifying
the plans for implementing the statutory and regulatory prohibitions
against employment discrimination on the basis of handicap.' 20
Although specifically stating the jurisdictional basis for the plain-
tiff's action, 1 21 the McNutt decision is less than clear with regard to
the basis of the plaintiff's substantive rights. The court appears to rely
upon the "variety of overlapping of federal statutes, regulations and
personnel directives." 122 Although it is difficult to delineate a
specific holding with regard to any particular statutory or regulatory
provision, McNutt is evidence of the judicial attitude which seeks to
effectuate relief for handicapped individuals who allege discrimination
in federal employment.
While a number of courts have seemingly been influenced by re-
peated instances of employment discrimination, which exist despite
strong expressions of federal policy to the contrary, other courts have
found further impetus to provide disabled individuals with judicial
relief from the sheer inadequacy, if not hypocrisy, of the particular
agency's internal procedural mechanisms. Such a case is Watson u.
Mason 123 which arose out of plaintiff's initial filing of a grievance
against the Veterans Administration alleging improper service of
evaluations 124 and two subsequent complaints alleging discrimination
on the basis of race, religion, sex, and physical handicap. 125 The
court found that although a formal complaint of discrimination on the
basis of disability was filed, the federal defendants specifically in-
structed the administration's grievance investigator to disregard that
claim. 126 Moreover, the court held that the administration's findings
and recommendations concerning the initial grievance were "ambigu-
ous and unintelligible," 127 even though they were issued more than
120. Id. at 1007. On the issue of the breadth of the injunctive relief, McNutt actually went
further than the lower court's decision in Smith. The Smith court later amended its order with
regard to injunctive relief to only require relief vis-a-vis the individual plaintiff.
121. The court based subject matter jurisdiction upon 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1966) and 28 U.S.C. §
1361 (1962). Id. at 997-999.
122. Id. at 996. The court's discussion of the various federal policies places significance upon
5 U.S.C. § 7153 (1966), 5 C.F.R. § 713.401 (1976) and provisions of the Federal Personnel
Manual. Id. at 996-97. The court also finds that Section 501 "was obviously designed to increase
agencys' responsibilities toward physically handicapped employees." Id. at 997.
123. Watson v. Mason, No. CV 76-322-WMB (C.D. Ca. filed April 2, 1976).
124. Id. at 3 (Finding of Fact No. 9).
125. Id. at 6 (Finding of Fact No. 21). Finding that the plaintiff had not exhausted adminis-
trative remedies in the processing or a repraisal grievance, the court denied relief tinder that
cause of action. Id. at 6, 8 (Finding of Fact No. 24, Conclusion of Law No. 8).
126. Id. at 6 (Finding of Fact No. 22).
127. Id. at 4 (Finding of Fact No. 15).
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one year after the filing of the original grievance.1 28 As a result of its
findings, the court remanded the case, ordering that the plaintiff's
claim of employment discrimination on the basis of physical disability
be processed pursuant to Section 753, even though no such remedy
was then specifically provided for under that section. 129
In another case, Doe v. Hampton,130 the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued an opinion which
may have far-reaching consequences for handicapped individuals who
allege violations of the Federal Personnel Manual. In Doe, the court
described the Manual as a "massive thesaurus of rules, guidelines,
suggestions and secular imprecations," 131 and remanded the cause to
the district court to determine whether a provision of the Federal
Personnel Manual, suggesting that federal agencies should make
"every reasonable effort" to assist disabled employees in adapting
to their jobs, 13 2 is binding upon the Department of the Treasury's
Bureau of Engraving and Printing.' 33 The court in Doe held that
a sufficient nexus existed to affirm the agency's decision to re-
move the plaintiff from her original employment. 13 4  The court
128. Id. (Finding of Fact No. 14(c)).
129. Id. at 7-8 (Conclusion of Law No. 7). In its accompanying judgment, the court expanded
upon the constitutional basis for its holding by declaring the defendant's failure to process the
plaintiff's claims of handicap discrimination to be a denial of equal protection, as well as a
denial of due process. The court went on to say that: "To hold otherwise would be to deprive
one discriminated against on account of physical handicap of the due process afforded those
discriminated against on account of race, religion, sex, national origin or age." Of course, the
newly enacted appeals procedure for complaints of handicap discrimination would now be avail-
able to the plaintiff in Watson, except for its limited retroactivity. Id. see discussion, supra
notes 26-36, and accompanying text.
130. 566 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
131. Id. at 273 n.21.
132. 339 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL 1-3(b)(1) (1972). This provision provides in relevant
part:
When an employee no longer can perform the duties of his or her position
efficiently and safely because of his physical or mental condition, the agency may
separate him on the basis of disability .... In view, however, the policy of the
Executive branch on utilization of employees who are handicapped or who develop
handicaps ...every reasonable effort should be made to reassign the employee to
duties he can perform efficiently and safely . . . .Specifically, the following alterna-
tives should be considered:
(1) A liberal grant of leave without pay when pay leave is exhausted and the
disability is of a remedial nature and likely to respond to treatment and hospitaliza-
tion. Many mental and emotional disorders formerly considered completely disabl-
ing, now fall in this category in view of the dramatic medical advance made in
treatment and rehabilitation of these conditions in recent years.
133. Doe v. Hampton, 556 F.2d at 284.
134. The court, in a heavily cited portion of its opinion, set forth its understanding of the role
of the federal courts vis-a-vis the review of federal personnel decisions.
In passing upon appellant's claims, we must remain cognizant of the confines of
our review. While transition from unreviewability to reviewability of adverse per-
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found, however, that the information contained in her fitness-for-duty
examination 135 was not sufficient to determine whether the agency
had made sufficient attempts to provide accommodations such as a
transfer or an extended leave. 13
6
Despite its adverse holding with regard to the plaintiff's dismissal
from her original employment, the court firmly established that the
Federal Personnel Manual requires a showing that the physical or
mental disability of the individual sought to be terminated must be
specifically related to job performance. 137  More importantly, Doe
sonnel actions against federal employees has left a legacy of some disagreement and
confusion in the reported cases, it is at least reasonably well-settled, that whatever
its exact scope, judicial review in the federal courts is necessarily limited. Federal
judges do not sit as ombudsman for government employment relations, nor do we
indulge in the conceit of substituting our own judgment ad libitum for that of the
agency. Rather, we concern ourself in the personnel business only insofar as is
necessary to insure that the action challenged (1) is not arbitrary or capricious; (2)
was reached in conformity with relevant procedural requirement; and (3) was not
otherwise unconstitutional.
Id. at 271-72 (Footnotes omitted).
135. The court takes care to adequately explain the purpose of the fitness-for-duty examina-
tion. Id. at 282-84. The examination is required whenever the federal employer seeks to justify
an adverse personnel action upon the physical or mental capacity of an employee. 752-1 FED-
ERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL S1-3(a)(5)(b) (Feb. 1972). The fitness-for-duty examination may also
be utilized for counseling the employees and for assessing the feasibility of various personnel
actions. In this context, it need not necessarily relate to an adverse personnel action.
Where an agency seeks to terminate an employee who is physically or mentally handicapped
for reasons related to the handicapping condition, "the agency should obtain a complete and
detailed report of physical examination without cost to the employee." 752-1 FEDERAL PER-
SONNEL MANUAL S1-3(a)(5)(d) (1972). The medical examination is designed to assess "the par-
ticular demands of the position" in relationship to "how the employee's performance or behavior
fails to meet these demands." Id.
136. Judge Robinson, in his dissent, presents a persuasive argument that because the major-
ity opinion found the results of the fitness-for-duty examination to be not sufficiently related to
the failure to seek reassignment, this same examination, "with its implicit suggestion of nexus,"
was not sufficient to rationalize the majority's decision with regard for the plaintiff's ability to
perform the actual job from which he was discharged. 556 F.2d at 11 (Robinson, J. dissenting).
137. 556 F.2d at 14. The court's holding stresses the requirement of a causal relationship
between the disability and the individual's job performance, thus strengthening the mandate of
the Federal Personnel Manual. 752-1 FED. PERSONNEL MANUAL SI-3(a)(5)(f) (1972) provides:
The agency must not rely solely upon a showing that the employee has a disabling
condition, even when the agency has obtained a medical opinion of incapacity.
Neither the placement of limitations on the duties which an employee is permitted
to perform or medical conclusions about the employee's physical condition is suffi-
cient cause for taking adverse action. The agency must establish a link between the
medical conclusion and (i) observed deficiencies in work performance or employee
behavior or (ii) high probability of hazard when the disabling condition may result
in injury to the employee or others because of the kind of work the employee does.
When an agency can clearly show high probability of serious hazard for example, an
agency has indisputable evidence that a truck driver with epilepsy is subject to
grande mal seizures the agency does not have to wait for the employee to have a
serious accident on the job before taking adverse action. The medical evidence
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symbolizes the extent of the judiciary's power to effectuate the
"strong expressions of Congressional, Executive and [Civil Service]
Commission policy favoring a liberal employment of the mentally and
physically handicapped." 138 In remanding to t1te district court for an
assessment of the agency's legally cognizable responsibilities under a
specific provision of the Federal Personnel Manual, the court of ap-
peals opinion contains favorable language concerning the potential for
pursuing substantive rights granted in the Manual. 139
The Doe approach provides yet another potential source of relief
from discriminatory practices. Furthermore, it presents problems
which illustrate the need for further reliance upon Section 501. First,
the holding in Doe depends upon the existence of jurisdiction under
the Administrative Procedure Act which requires the aggrieved indi-
vidual to first process his or her grievance through the cumbersome
administrative process. 140  Second, the particular question at is-
linked with the showing of potential hazard would be sufficient cause for taking
adverse action. In all other cases, however, the agency must link the Medical con-
clusion with observed deficiencies in work performance or employee behavior.
Id. (Court's emphasis).
As a parenthetical note, the statement in this provision with regard to the "truck driver with
epilepsy" proceedes upon the assumption that the individual has been shown to be "subject to
grande mal seizures." Clearly, it would not be sufficient for the federal agency to show that the
individual has a history of epilepsy, or even that the individual currently has epilepsy. In order
to show that the individual "is subject to" seizures, the agency must show that the individual's
seizures are not controlled or controllable by medication. See, e.g., Duran v. City of Tampa 430
F. Supp. 75 (M.D. Fla. 1977); Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp. 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D.
Pa. 1977); see also discussion of safety in note 150 infra.
138. Doe v. Hampton, 556 F.2d at 31.
139. The court held that:
Although the Manual's numerous regulations, instructions, and suggestions relating
to adverse actions based on medical disabilities, taken together, are something con-
siderably less than a paradigm of clarity, we are of the conviction that to remain
consistent with the evident spirit of Commission policies towards the physically and
mentally handicapped, an employing agency must exercise an informed discretion in
determining whether the assignment or leave-without-pay are feasible alternatives
to removal.
Id. at 34. The court also notes that "[i]f the manual provision to which appellant now refers us
is indeed a binding regulation and if the agency has failed to comply with its mandate to the
prejudice of its employee, then an essential predicate to a valid removal will have been want-
ing." Id. at 30.
140. If the district court, on remand, holds that the particular provision of the Federal Per-
sonnel Manual is mandatory, rather then precatory, the court notes that a further remand to the
Civil Service Commission will be required in order to obtain the medical evidence necessary to
determine whether reassignment or extended leave are feasible. Id. at 33. Although the court
indicates that reviewing courts would then assess whether the agency abused its discretion in a
decision not to reassign or extend leave-without-pay, in a footnote to that statement the court
seemingly vascilates by predicating the standard of review upon the assumption that an agency's
effort are reviewable at all. Id. at 33-34.
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sue-the agency's duty, if any, to seek alternatives to complete re-
moval from employment- becomes substantially clearer under Sec-
tion 501.141 Although the implication of a private right of action
under Section 501 would not do away with the need to interpret the
Congressional intent in the context of specific substantive issues, the
availability of a generous amount of legislative history would assist the
judicial decision-making process. More importantly, actions under
Section 501 would lead to a greater degree of uniformity. Rather than
141. Despite parting dictum that "good indications" are contained in the existing record
which support a finding that "at least, a liberal extension of leave-without-pay, coupled with
continued medical treatment, may indeed have been both feasible and fruitful," Id. at 37, the
court noted that "for what we consider a rather generous period of time," the employer did
attempt "to accommodate and help ameliorate appellant's unfortunate emotional problems." Id.
at 6. See also id. at 18 n.25.
The court also notes that "under no circumstance would an agency be required to search high
and low throughout its own bureaus and the entire civil service system for a position in which a
mentally or physically handicapped employee can satisfactorily perform despite his or her dis-
abilities." Id. at 34. Thus, with regard to the extent of the employer's duty to accommodate, if
the district court on remand finds that such a duty exists tinder the Federal Personnel Manual,
the Court of Appeals concludes that the agency's "efforts need only be reasonable, gauged by
the nature of the employee's disability and the availability of suitable alternative positions." Id.
However, the decision in Doe is not couched in terms of the technical concept of "reasonable
accommodations" as that term has evolved from Title V of the Rehabilitation Act. Both the
Department of Labor and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, in fulfilling their
respective responsibilites under Sections 503 and 504, have mandated a specific employer re-
sponsibility to provide "reasonable accommodations." 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(b) (1977); 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.12 (1977). Under Section 503, the contractors must make accommodation to the physical
and mental limitations of an employee or applicant for employment unless the contractor can
demonstrate an undue hardship on the conduct of the business. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(b) (1977).
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare has defined reasonable accommodations as
requiring employers to make facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by
handicapped persons, and the definition specifically includes such actions as job restructuring,
part-time or modified work schedules, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, and
the provision of readers or interpreters. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b). In its official Analysis of the
Regulations implementing Section 504 in programs and activities receiving their federal financial
assistance from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the Department explains
that the concept of reasonable accommodations depends, to a great extent, upon balancing the
size of the employer against the cost of the accommodation. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,688 (1977) to be
codified in 45 C*F.R. § 84.12(b) (1977). This analysis provides substantial insight into the con-
cept as it is defined in both Sections 503 and 504. In implementing its mandate under Exec.
Order No. 11,914, 3 C.F.R. 117 (1976), to coordinate the implementation of Section 504 by all
federal departments and agencies, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare continues
its original definition of "reasonable accommodations." More important to this consideration is
the decision of the Civil Service Commission to adopt the concept of "reasonable accommoda-
tions" as a substantive requirement in its recently enacted regulations.
These interpretations of the statutory mandates in Title V recognize that the principle of
reasonable accommodations than do the provisions of Sections 503 and 504, the proposition that
tunities for individuals with handicapping conditions, and that the concept of reasonable ac-
commodations is inherent in the'concept of non-discrimination in employment. The interpreta-
tions of the agencies charged with the enforcement of Sections 501, 503 and 504 are entitled to
great deference. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
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Under Section 501, the duty of federal employers to provide reasonable accommodations is
even more clear in the legislation than it is tinder Section 503 and 504. Section 501 specifically
mandates reasonable accommodations by requiring that each agency's Affirmative Action Pro-
gram Plan "shall include a description of the extent to which and methods whereby the special
needs of handicapped employees are being met." 29 U.S.C. §§ 791(b) (1973 (emphasis added).
The legislative history to Section 501 further expresses the Congressional intent. The Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare enunciated its intention to "insure that the special
needs of handicapped individuals are being met on the job." S. REP. No. 48, 93d Cong'., 1st
Sess. 51 (1973). Similar language is also found in S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 49
(1973). The specific recognition by the Congress that reasonable accommodations must be pro-
vided in federal employment is clear from this mandate to insure that the "special needs" of
handicapped individuals are being met. The provision of reasonable accommodations is a pre-
requisite to the view which Congress had of the federal government as a "model employer" of
the handicapped, and Section 501 contemplates that federal employers will go at least as far, if
not further, in this area than federal contractors and federally assisted programs.
Additionally, several recent decisions of the Comptroller General of the United States have
forcefully interpreted Section 501 to require the provision of reasonable accommodations to
handicapped federal employees. In the Matter of Collins, Dr. Collins was a disabled individual
who required the use of a wheelchair and who, by reason of his disability, also required a
travelling companion. File B-186598 (May 26, 1977). In its decision to authorize reimbursement
for the travel expenses of Dr. Collin's wife incurred during the fulfillment of his duties as a
member of the Commerce Technical Advisory Board, the Comptroller General found that the
appointment of Dr. Collins to the Board "was consistent with and in furtherance of the Federal
Government Policies of non-discrimination and affirmative action in employment of the physi-
cally handicapped .. " Id. at 2. In reaching this decision, the Comptroller General relied
upon Section 501 and reasoned that:
Requiring Dr. Collins to bear the additional expenses of an escort would cause
him to suffer a financial loss as the result of traveling on official business, and, in
the future, might prevent him from conducting official business. In the latter event,
the Advisory Board would not be able to make use of Dr. Collins' technical exper-
tise. Thus, denying the attendant's travel expenses could frustrate the above-cited
government policies with regard to employment of the physically handicapped.
Id. at 3. See also In the Matter of Schultz, authorizing the payment of travel expenses for a
companion to a blind consultant to the Energy Research and Development Administration. File
B-187492 (May 26, 1977). See generally In the Matter of National Advisory Committee on an
Accessible Environment-Salanes of Attendants for Handicapped Members, File B-189010 (Au-
gust 15, 1977).
Although the statutory language in Section 501 more succinctly states the duty to provide
reasonable accommodations than do the provisions of Sections 503 and 504, the proposition that
Congress, intended to insure that reasonable accommodations were afforded handicapped
employees and applicants through its enactment of Title V is further reinforced by the reaction
of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare to the inclusion of the requirement of
reasonable accommodations in the initial regulations promulgated pursuant to Section 503. 36
C.F.R. 20566 (1974). On August 21, 1974, shortly after the publication of these regulations on
June 11, 1974, the Senate Committee, in reviewing the proposed amendment to the definition
of "handicapped individual" under Title V wrote to then Secretary of Labor Peter J. Brennan
asking: "What are the business necessities, financial costs, and resulting personnel problems
which would mitigate against an employer's responsibilities to make reasonable accommodations
to the physical and mental limitations of an employee?" S. REP. No. 1139, 93rd Cong., 2nd
Sess. 86 (1974) (emphasis in original). The matter-of-fact approach taken in this question evi-
dences the legislative intent that the Congress expected to find the concept of reasonable ac-
commodations provided for tinder the provisions of Title V.
Against this backdrop, the intent of 5 U.S.C. § 3102 (1966), which provides for the employ-
ment of reading assistance to serve without pay for blind employees of the federal government,
has been clarified by the enactment of Section 501. This 1962 statute was an attempt to insure
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having to decide on a case by case basis which of the multitude of
provisions in the federal personnel scheme grant affirmative, adjudic-
able rights, Section 501 would reach any discriminatory act or omis-
sion, regardless of whether a specific provision of federal personnel
policy addressed the issue.
Even without considering the private right of action issue under
Section 501, that statute and its legislative history are germane both to
the ultimate outcome of the remand in Doe and to future cases which will
construe other Federal Personnel Manual provisions. The forceful
statements of legislative intent under Section 501 support the finding
of actionable claims based upon the pre-existing plethora of federal
policy attempting to curb employment discrimination.
In Shaposka v. United States,142 the Court of Claims of liberally
construed the federal regulatory scheme in order to afford relief to a
deaf-mute employee who had been discharged from the National
Archives and Records Service. This well-reasoned decision, in addi-
tion to continuing the favorable trend of cases affording substantive
relief to aggrieved individuals, provides considerable insight into the
potential for, and actuality of, abuses in federal personnel special pro-
cedures utilized for the hiring of handicapped individuals.
In Shaposka, the plaintiff argued that: (1) the procedural rights af-
forded to career-conditional status employees 143 were improperly
denied to him at the time of his termination; (2) he had been termi-
nated as a result of discrimination against him because of his handi-
capping condition; and (3) his termination was prompted by a letter
written to his Congressman concerning his job situation. 14 4  In its
decision granting summary judgment to the plaintiff, the Court of
Claims reconstructed the defendant's hiring practices and found that
the plaintiff had been improperly classified, thus foregoing any need
to decide plaintiff's second and third claims.
Despite the fact that the plaintiff had previously been employed by
the federal government through the normal hiring process, the de-
that blind individuals were neither denied initial employment nor denied subsequent promo-
tions as a result of their utilization of readers. The statute originally sought to ensure that such
readers were not treated as unauthorized individuals and to make clear the Congressional intent
that the statute not be construed to authorize the payment for such readers. The subsequent
enactment of Section 501 expresses the current federal policy on this latter issue-to ensure
that equal employment opportunities are available to all handicapped individuals through the
provision of reasonable accommodations, which would, of course, include the provision of read-
ers at the expense of the federal employer.
142. 563 F.2d 1013 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
143. 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (1966).
144. 563 F.2d at 1018.
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fendants based their hiring of the plaintiff upon separate procedures
which would rot have been used for individuals without handicaps.
Had the defendants appropriately utilized the special hiring proce-
dures, the plaintiff would not have been entitled to the extensive
procedural protections which are afforded to career-conditional
employees. However, the Court of Claims, by finding that the defen-
dant had improperly utilized the special hiring procedures, held that
because the plaintiff's original hiring should have been through the
usual procedures, the plaintiff was entitled to all procedural protec-
tions granted to career-conditional employees.
In its attempt to utilize a separate system for the hiring of the
plaintiff, the defendant made two fatal errors. First, the defendant
recorded the plaintiff's original hiring as one of a temporary appoint-
ment. 145 However, the utilization of the temporary app6intment was
held to be clearly inapplicable because the defendant had intended to
hire the plaintiff on a long-term basis. 146  Recognizing the error of
this appointment, the defendant maintained that its actual intent was
to have hired the plaintiff under the 700-hour appointment program
available for the hiring of "severly handicapped persons."
The 700-hour program, as described in the Federal Personnel
Manual, provides temporary employment limited to 700 hours for
handicapped persons. 147 The purpose of this program is to provide a
trial period of employment to enable an employer to determine whether
a handicapped applicant is able to satisfy the job requirements. 148
This program is beginning to receive criticism from a number of
handicapped individuals and advocacy groups. By its definition, the
special program would permit the hiring of an individual who has the
necessary training and qualifications to perform the job tasks. Clearly,
under Sections 503 and 504, government contractors and federally as-
sisted programs would not be permitted to develop separate hiring
schemes, which entail a lower level of benefits and job security, for
handicapped applicants who are "otherwise qualified" to perform the
essential job tasks. 149  Under Sections 503 and 504, the employer
145. Id. at 1015.
146. The authorities for temporary appointments are set forth in 5 C.F.R. § 316.401 (1977).
The purpose of temporary appointment is to forego the difficulties in dealing with the register
where a specific administrative need can be filled by a limited appointment for a specific period
of time which is less than one year. Id. at 316.401. See also 316 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL
§ 4-1(a).
147. 316 FED. PERSONNEL MANUAL § 4-7.
148. Id. at 4-2.
149. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6 (1977); 45 C.F.R. § 84.11 (1977); 45 C.F.R. § 85.51 (1977).
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would have the burden of showing that a particular individual was not
capable of performing the job efficiently or safely. Failing to meet
that burden, the employer could not base an adverse employment
decision upon any presumptions arising out of the individual's handi-
cap. Under the 700-hour program, the federal government is per-
mitted to channel an individual into a less desirable employment
status, even though he or she is "otherwise qualified." 150
Although the 700-hour temporary trial appointment may have some
advantages for disabled individuals, especially when used to fulfill the
affirmative action requirements contained in Section 501 by expedit-
ing the cumbersome hiring process, it does establish a separate system
by which procedural and substantive benefits are decreased. By per-
mitting federal employers to base their employment decision provi-
sion upon stereotyped notions concerning the abilities of handicapped
job applicants and upon 'fears" that a handicapped individual will not
"fit in with and be accepted by the workforce,"151 the federal gov-
ernment has established a double standard-one for itself and the
other for those employers it regulates.
Moreover, a provision which implicitly permits the employer to
base a hiring decision upon the social or other non-job-related values
of the existing work force is inapposite to any accepted concept of
civil rights and equal employment opportunities. Although such a
standard has been previously evidenced during our Nation's history,
the past lines of demarcation and segregation based upon race, gen-
der, national origin, and religion have been forcefully and completely
removed from our official policies.
The recognition of the deficiencies in the 700-hour program promp-
ted the court in Shaposka to describe the detrimental effect which
would be achieved by adopting the defendant's argument that, al-
though the temporary limited appointment was improperly used, the
defendant's intent to place the plaintiff in the 700-hours appointment
150. The purpose of the 700-hour program is described in the Federal Personnel Manual:
Many severely handicapped people need a trial appointment because they are un-
able to obtain competitive appointment even with examination modification or re-
ferral service, or both, through the Coordinator Program. One barrier to their
employment may be inability to be selected competitively even though they have
been trained and they are qualified to perform their job tasks. Another barrier may
be employer reluctance to hire them for fear they will not be able to perform on
the job efficiently or safely, or fit in with and be accepted by the work force. These
obstacles can often be overcome by use of the 700-hour temporary trial appointment
authority.
316 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL § 4-2.
151. Id.
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should prevail. 152  Because of the disparate treatment which results
from being hired under the 700-hour program, the court rejected
the defendant's argument, holding:
Where defendant is hiring a physically handicapped person, and
chooses to restrict that appointment to a temporary limited ap-
pointment not to exceed 700 hours, it is encumbent upon the
agency to make the nature of the appointment clear in the hiring
process. Absent such specification, the presumption should be that
the handicapped person is entitled to the same appointment status
that a non-handicapped person would receive. Defendant should
not be permitted to take a provision designed to aid the handicap-
ped and turn it to plaintiff's detriment where the ground rules
were not established at the time plaintiff was hired. 153
As in the other cases where the judiciary has sought to construe
provisions of the Federal Personnel Manual in a manner favorable to
the handicapped individual, the Shaposka court indicated that its
holding was consistent with the Congressional intent expressed in
Section 7153.154 Thus, while not creating a private cause of action
Linder that statute, Shaposka demonstrates the ability of a concerned
federal judiciary to make real the Congressional intent, despite the
existence of a judicial review policy which might lend itself to a more
restrictive view of the courts' role.
Another similarity between Shaposka and other recent cases is that
the court, while not basing its holding upon a finding of actual
employment discrimination, was moved by the existence of dis-
criminatory treatment by the employer. Although the defendant con-
tended that "several incidents where plaintiff either exhibited displays
of temper or wrote offensive notes to fellow employees" had resulted
in the plaintiff's temporary reassignment after his initial hiring,1 5 5 the
defendant admitted that it "found his editorial work to be very satis-
152. 563 F.2d at 1018. The court noted:
If we were to hold for defendant in this case, we would effectively be placing
plaintiff in a less than beneficial employment status, on the basis of his physical
handicap, than the erroneous temporary limited appointment not to exceed one
classification in which he was of obstensibily hired. The temporary limited appoint-
ment not to exceed 700 hours is designed to aid the severely handicapped by
actually giving them a chance to demonstrate on a temporary basis, that they are
capable of performing a job, where otherwise they might not receive such an op-
portunity. FPM ch. 306, subch. 4-2(c). The interpretation defendants seek would
discriminate against, rather than aid, the physically handicapped.
Id.
153. Id.
154. 1d.
155. Id. at 1016.
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factory." 156 The court concluded that, under the facts presented, if
the plaintiff were afforded the procedural protections provided to
career-conditional employees, the federal defendant probably could
not have met its substantive burden of proving that the removal of
the individual from competitive service would "promote the efficiency
of the service." 157
Despite some judicial reluctance to move beyond the traditional
role of restraint in administrative law, 158 and despite those decisions
which fail to recognize the existence of discriminatory employment
practices, 159 the lower court's decision in Smith and the decisions in
156. Id. at 1018.
157. See 5 U.S.C. § 501 (1970). Specifically, the court found that:
The problem seemed to be more a communications difficulty with his fellow work-
ers than anything else. In view of plaintiff's particular physical handicap, it is not
surprising that certain communications problems would arise. The nature of the
charges brought against plaintiff, the handicap involved, and the commitment of
Congress ... to avoid discrimination based on physical handicap in government
employment would place a heavy burden upon the agency ...
563 F.2d at 1018-19.
158. E.g., Jones v. Rumsfeld, Civil Action No. 76-4-S (M.D. Ala. August 13, 1976). In
granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court disposed of the plaintiff's
claim that his discharge was due to discrimination based upon handicapping condition in viola-
tion of 5 C.F.R. § 315.806(b)(2) (1977). The court refused to review the Civil Service Commis-
sion's decision and rejected the plaintiff's substantial claim, because the particular regulations
specifically provided that the Commission's decision is final. Id. at 315.806(e). "No exception is
made for district court review. Thus it appears and this court now holds that plaintiff cannot
maintain an action in this court based solely on one paragraph of J 315.806 while another
paragraph bars this court's right of review." Jones v. Rumsfeld, supra at 2. The Court's reluc-
tance to break any new ground is further illustrated by its reasoning that, even under more
liberal interpretations in other circuits, the Commission's decision would not have been deemed
to be arbitrary. Id. at 2-3.
159. Smith v. United States Postal Service, Civil Action No. 76-2452-S (D. Mass. August 10,
1977), is the most disappointing decision of this genre. In Smith, two pseudonymous plaintiffs
brought a class action against the United States Postal Service and the four national postal
workers unions asserting constitutional, statutory (5 U.S.C. § 7153 (1966), 39 U.S.C. § 6
1003(b), 1208(b) and Section 501 and regulatory (5 C.F.R. § 713.401(a) (1969)) causes of action
Id. at 1 n.2.
The plaintiffs were hired in 1966 and 1967 respectively as "public policy employees" under
"excepted service" provisions of the civil service law permitting the appointment of certain
individuals, including physically and mentally handicapped individuals, under an allegedly "so-
cial remedial employment program." See generally 5 U.S.C. § 2103 (1966); 5 C.F.R. Part 212(A)
& (C) (1977). After the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. §§ 101-5605, the Postal Service
negotiated a new collective bargaining agreement with the postal workers unions which specifi-
cally excluded "public policy employees" from the contractual agreement. Id. at 2. As a result of
these developments, the plaintiffs were made members of the specific national craft unit for
their particular craft and, by the express terms of the contract, they only began accruing senior-
ity rights after one additional year of satisfactory service. Id. at 2-3.
As a result of these various maneuvers, the plaintiffs were adversely affected when the Postal
Service reassigned them to part-time status prior to reassigning other employees who had en-
tered the craft through the normal hiring process subsequent to the actual dates when the
plaintiffs began working. Thus, although the plaintiffs began working in 1966 and 1967 respec-
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tively, their seniority did not begin to accrue until 1973, and they were treated as junior to
some postal workers who began employment after 1967 but before 1973. Id. at 3.
In holding that the plaintiff's Complaint was barred by the provisions of the grievance-arbitra-
tion provisions of the contract and that "the complaint fails to identify any conduct of the unions
that would even arguably amount to a breech of the duty of fair representation," the court then
dismissed the plaintiffs' claim of discrimination:
The plaintiffs' claim of discrimination, however, is without merit. The remedial
program pursuant to which the plaintiffs were hired was designed to alleviate ap-
pointments in the Civil Service. The plaintiffs could not otherwise have obtained
their positions as mail handlers. Their employment status remained unchanged by
the 1971 Agreement. The 1973 Memorandum of Understanding obviously improved
the security of their position, although it did not grant the plaintiffs retroactive
seniority. Unions and employers were vested with considerable discretion to ba-
lance the competing interest of various employees and to reach compromisal solu-
tions. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffiman, 345 U.S. 330, 337-38 (1953). The fatal defect in
the plaintiffs' argument is that they lost no seniority by virtue of the 1971 and 1973
National Agreelnents.
Id. at 4-5.
At the risk of presumptuous analysis, it could be said that perhaps the "fatal defect" in the
court's reasoning is that it fails to recognize the express Congressional intent to prohibit
employment discrimination. Regardless of the nomenclature given to the paternalistic system
developed for "helping" the handicapped, the fact remains that the plaintiffs were employed for
a considerable length of time along side other workers who performed the same job func-
tions. The court's opinion cites n6 evidence of-decreased work capacity, less consistent work
product, or any other indication that the plaintiffs' employment responsibilities varied in any
significant respect from those who were hired through the competitive process. In fact, the
plaintiffs successfully completed the additional year of probationary status which was imposed
upon them by the 1973 Memorandum of Understanding.
The court in Smith dismissed the plaintiff's claim of discrimination because of the "remedial"
nature of the "public policy" program which "was designed to alleviate the condition" of those
unable to secure competitive appointments in the Civil Service." Although not defining the
'condition" which was to be alleviated, the "condition" was probably less their mental retard-
ation than the Postal Service's unwillingness to disregard their handicapping conditions and
focused on their job skills. By failing to inquire concerning why they were unable to secure
competitive appointments, despite their ability to peform the essential job fsnctions, the court
fails to make the inquiry which is essential to the proper adjudication of the legal issue. "Con-
siderable discretion to balance the competing interest of various employees and to reach com-
promised settlements" does not justify disparate treatment which is otherwise proscribed by
law.
Another case which fails to go beyond the initial assumption that a program designed to assist
handicapped individuals actually succeeds in its purpose is Atkinson v. United States Postal
Service, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5208 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). In Atkinson, the plaintiff, who represented
himself pro se, was also hired under the "public policy program." After commencing employ-
ment as a mail handler, the plaintiff applied for a transfer to the transportation platform; his
request was denied on the basis that the work environment "would expose plaintiff to an un-
necessarily dangerous working situation." Id. at 5208. After failing to obtain the sought-after
transfer, plaintiff voluntarily resigned, and he indicated on his resignation form: "[N]o one with
a handicap is allowed to work in G.P.O. Transportation where I tried to get assigned for two
years." Id.
While not reaching the issue of what effect the plaintiff's voluntary resignatioti might have
upon his cause of action, the court indicated that decisions regarding the non-transfer of
employees involve agency discretion and are not subject to'judicial review. "Plaintiff has a
heavy burden of showing that the failure of defendant to approve his transfer, constituted im-
proper agency action." Id. at 5209. In finding that the plaintiff had made no such showing, the
court held that: "[tihere is no sound reason for this court to substitute its discretion for the
discretion of the Postal Service." Id.
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Doe, Watson, McNuttt, Ryan, and Shaposka are evidence that the
bureaucratic entanglement can be overcome. However, few, if any,
established rules emerge from the pattern of these cases. While a
prediction concerning the future course of judicial events might seem
premature and unwise, there is sufficient precedent to infer that the
federal courts are becoming receptive to the existence of tremendous
inconsistencies of the federal bureaucracy.
'CONCLUSION
In Coleman v. Darden,160 the federal district court for the District
of Colorado quickly swept away the plaintiff's constitutional claims 161
and the potential for judicial redress under Section 501. In so doing,
the court upheld the federal agency's job description which excluded
from consideration for the position of research assistant or paralegal
specialist any individual not possessing "the ability to read printed
material the size of typewritten characters." 162  The court's decision
unashamedly supports the theory that blind individuals should not
aspire to white collar positions within the federal government.
As the Supreme Court recognized- in this decade, "Government is
the social organ to which all in our society look for the, promotion of
liberty, justice, fair and equal treatment, and the setting of worthy
norms and goals for social conduct." 163 Unless the judiciary is wil-
ling to shoulder its share of the responsibility for insuring that the
federal government operates in a nondiscriminatory manner, this lofty
Again, the court's reasoning gives too much credence to agency discretion. The granting of
summary judgment as a matter of law seems inappropriate in light of the plaintiff's allegation. If
the plaintiff could have shown at trial that the Postal Service uniformly prohibited all handicap-
ped individuals, including the plaintiff, from work on the transportation platform, that practice
would have constituted a clear violation of the federal government's frequently expressed policy
of non-discrimination.
Even the existence of "safety" considerations must place unfettered discretion with the
employer, and certainly the courts must look behind the bare assertion of such considerations.
The elevation of concepts of safety to "the status of a sacred cow," in whose name all must be
sacrificed, cannot justify the existence of job criterion which is based upon an irrefutable pre-
sumptions concerning the abilities of individuals with particular disabilities to perform a par-
ticular job. In re Samuel Bingham Co., 67 L.A. 76 (1976). See also Chrysler Outboard Corp. v.
Dept. of Industry, Labor and Human Relations, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6883 (Cir. Ct. 1976).
160. 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6788 (D. Colo. 1977).
161. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss possible causes of action tinder the
constitution, such claims should certainly be brought in conjunction with employment discrimi-
nation litigation. See generally Note, Developing A More Objective Means of Ex Post Facto Law
Analysis, 27 DE PAUL L. REV. 191 (1977); Note, Applying the Constitutional Doctrine of Ir-
rebuttable Presumption to the Handicapped-Gu rmankin v. Costanzo, 27 De Paul L. Rev.
1199 (1977).
162. 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. at 6789.
163. Adickes v. Kress, 398 U.S. 144, 190 (1970).
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standard, which the Rehabilitation Act seeks to obtain, will wither
and die. A sensitive, enlightened judicial approach to resolving claims
of discrimination by the federal government may be emerging. Pre-
conceived leanings toward judicial restraint, however, threaten to
thwart the congressional purpose of forbidding discrimination on the
basis of a handicap. Unless a strong body of case law solidifies the
substantive and procedural rights of handicapped individuals, idealis-
tic notions of equal employment opportunities will remain a hollow
echo with neither substance nor form. The ultimate response of the
judiciary to the employment discrimination which occurs within the
-federal government will be the dispositive determination of whether
Section 501 remains a mockery of justice or becomes a monument to
equal treatment under the law.
